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CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION 
The basic task of this research Is to estimate the 
direct benefits received by tenants in public housing 
projects, the direct benefits received by these tenants if 
they were to participate in housing projects operated under 
Section 236 of the United States Housing Act of 1968 
(hereafter referred to as Section 236 housing), and the 
direct benefits these same tenants would receive if they 
were to participate in both Section 236 housing and the Rent 
Supplement Program (hereafter referred to as Section 236 
housing with Rent Supplement). Peripherally, we obtain 
estimates of the income elasticity of low income families. 
Chapter II contains a brief discussion of the com­
plexities from which this study abstracts. Chapter III is 
an overview of the programs under study and a statement of 
the questions we are asking. Chapter IV tackles the question 
of a "best" measure of benefits. Chapter V is a short 
discussion of the functional forms we select for our utility 
functions. Chapter VI sets forth the stochastic framework 
for our estimation; this involves the interesting questions 
of estimating utility functions and properly specifying the 
consumer's allocation problem. In Chapter VII we discuss 
our data, its limitations, and identify the statistical 
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techniques required by the data. Chapter VIII more carefully 
specifies the estimation techniques, outlining the random 
regression coefficients framework and explaining the 
quadratic programming approach to applying inequality 
constraints on parameters. 
Chapter IX is a straightforward presentation of our 
numerical results with a limited amount of interpretation. 
Chapter X attempts to clarify the meaning of the numbers 
given in the previous chapter and contains our conclusions. 
Chapter XI indicates avenues of possible further study based 
on this research. 
The results of this research are interesting, but suffer 
certain limitations. The estimates of tenant benefits imply 
society must derive considerable utility from imposing 
transfers in-kind vis-a-vis income transfers, indirect 
benefits be relatively high, supply considerations be of 
great import, or the programs are a very inefficient alloca­
tion of resources. Peripherally, we estimate housing demand 
elasticities for several price and income levels ; our 
results contrast with aggregate estimates found in the 
literature. As the Department of Housing Bind Urban Develop­
ment is using these aggregate figures in several studies of 
low-income households, the apparent conflict may be of some 
import for public policy. 
The most severe restriction on the results is that 
estimates are not consistent due to errors in variables. 
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Other difficulties are the difficulty of measuring the 
market value of subsidized units and the lack of theoretical 
insights into an appropriate functional form for the utility 
function. Fortunately, neither alternative estimates of 
market values nor changes in functional form severely affect 
our major conclusions; however, such matters do affect inter­
pretations of some issues, such as the distribution of 
benefits among tenants. 
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CHAPTER II; COMPLEXITIES FOREGONE 
Our empirical analysis will be cast in terms of the 
classical marginal utility analysis of a two commodity world. 
However, before we descend to this extreme simplification, 
we will examine some of the complexities we wish to escape. 
While some consumer allocation issues might be quite 
amenable to elementary marginal analysis, for instance the 
choice between scotch and bourbon, the choice of habitat is 
not such an issue. There are five considerations which 
complicate the analysis of this choice; they are: temporality, 
imperfect knowledge, uncertainty, transactions costs, and 
the discreteness of commodities. 
These factors interact and have a degree of importance 
in this choice as in no other save, perhaps, the choices of 
marital status and occupation. The complexity can be high­
lighted by looking at the frequently made assumption that 
consumption and savings are separable decisions. Clearly, 
the choice between owning and renting involves a decision 
about the allocation of income over time and the assumption 
is unwarranted. 
A complete theory of consumer choice is not our object 
here. However, we will look in brief how each of the five 
factors above relates to the choice of habitat and also how 
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they interact. We will discuss how some of these factors 
might be incorporated into a study such as this one when we 
outline matters for further research. 
The chief direct impact of temporality is on the choice 
to buy or rent. Ownership generally involves greater costs 
in the present in return for lowered costs in the future. 
Most home-buyers justify the expense as an "investment", 
that is, a form of saving. Temporarily also introduces all 
possibilities of change: in income, tastes, opportunities, 
prices, etc. Very importantly, the subjective value of a 
specific abode often rises with time as ties are made in 
the neighborhood. 
Imperfect knowledge's chief impacts are dynamic effects 
produced through learning (as when one moves soon after 
occupancy because of the noisy neighbors) and the 
introduction of information costs (such as brokers' 
fees). Information costs lead one to restrict his universe 
of choice to some subset of the available alternatives. 
Uncertainty is a highly important factor whose in­
fluence is mainly felt in conjunction with temporality 
and/or imperfect knowledge. One might buy out of fear of 
a low income in the future, or rent out of. a fear of an 
early demise. One might buy a less attractive tract home 
because it is more certain to appreciate than an isolated 
property, A risk averter might select a home he will soon 
outgrow as his income rises, rather than risk being unable 
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to afford his mortgage because of a failure to advance. 
Just as transactions costs "lock" a risk averter into 
"too little" housing for a while, others might start out 
with "too much" housing in anticipation of income increases. 
Transactions costs are particularly higji when one changes 
the pattern of his consumption; this will entail search 
costs, transportation costs, perhaps new financing costs, 
while the status quo costs only the 8çi stamp on the rent 
or mortgage payment. 
Of great significance in choosing a habitat is the 
discreteness of the commodities one has to choose from. 
While neighborhoods may vary almost continuously in quality, 
bedrooms, bathrooms, and the like come in integer numbers 
(ignoring the promoter's ^  bath); most importantly, it is 
very difficult to rent two-thirds of one's home and buy the 
rest. 
In short, the choice of habitat is a matter of 
maximizing intertemporal utility with information and 
transactions costs included under conditions of imperfect 
knowledge and uncertainty subject to an uncertain income 
stream. Ow. 
In this study, we reduce the vector of commodities and 
services making up habitat to a single, composite commodity, 
housing services. Moreover, we ignore temporality; nominal 
income in the observed year is assumed to be the relevant 
decision variable, not some "permanent" income. Imperfect 
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knowledge, uncertainty, transactions costs, and discreteness 
are entirely ignored. Ignoring the last of these is somewhat 
justified in that the vast majority of public housing tenants 
have little or no chance of owning their own homes, the 
primary issue arising from discreteness; the other factors 
are ignored because we have no way of quantitatively dealing 
with them within the confines of our data. 
Some of these issues are of considerable importance 
when considering the costs and benefits involved in 
relocating households, particularly length of residence. 
This issue in particular will be reconsidered in the section 
on suggestions for further reference. 
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CHAPTER III; THE PROGRAMS 
Section 236 is relatively straightforward, in contrast 
to the complex of possibilities embraced in public housing. 
Therefore we shall first present the relevant details of 236. 
Section 23^ proposes to stimulate production of housing 
for persons of low and moderate income by offering to pay 
the difference between the actual monies due for principal, 
interest, and insurance on an FHA mortgage and the monies due 
if the interest were one per centum per annum. This subsidy 
is available if the owner of the housing project is a non­
profit, limited dividend, or cooperative entity, and only so 
long as the project is occupied by persons of low or moderate 
income. The value of housing is limited according to the 
size of family the units can accommodate: The upper income 
limit for tenants is set as 1355^ of the public housing income 
limits in the area. 
This last point is indicative of a fundamental differ­
ence between public housing and section 236; the latter is 
intended to provide for both moderate and low income persons, 
while the former serves only those of low income. The focal 
point of this study in terms of policy considerations is 
whether, in fact, section 236 can serve persons of low 
inc ome. 
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A final point of great importance for our study is that 
tenants in section 236 housing pay as rent the greater of 
two sums: first, twenty-five per cent of their income (not 
to exceed a pre-determined "fair market rent", of which we 
shall say more later); or second, a rent sufficient to meet 
maintenance costs and the fixed expenses of the owner based 
on a one per cent mortgage. The import of this is tenants 
may pay rents in excess of twenty-five per cent of their 
income. 
In short, section 236 offers a direct subsidy to owners 
of housing projects on the condition that this subsidy be 
passed on to the tenants who must be of low or moderate 
income. This subsidy is only a mortgage reduction payment 
and bears no relation to operating costs. 
Public housing is a much more involved program. First 
we will outline the primary characteristics of the instru­
ment, and then we shall mention some of the subsidiary aspects 
of the program. Fortunately public housing is long 
established and many of its possibilities have been little 
used, so we can focus on the more significant procedures. 
Public housing stimulates the production of housing 
for persons of low income by offering various subsidies to 
local governments which undertake such projects. There are 
two fundamental, alternative subsidies. The first, and 
most common, is a fixed annual contribution paid to the 
local public housing agency by the Federal government and 
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contracted for in advance. This contribution is limited to 
the amount necessary (as determined by HUD) to assure the 
low-rent character of the project, but it may not exceed a 
sum equal to the going Federal rate plus one per cent, times 
the development cost of the housing project involved, 
(However, additional contributions are available for units 
occupied by elderly persons, by persons of unusually low 
income, by persons displaced by government action, or by 
large families.) An alternative to fixed annual contribu­
tions is available; this is a capital grant large enough to 
assure the low rent character of the project, but in no case 
more than twenty-five per cent of the project's development 
cost, 
In order for a local housing agency to qualify for one 
of these subsidies, local governments must meet several 
provisos. First, in the case of fixed contributions, all 
involved political subdivisions must waive real and personal 
property taxes on the project, in lieu of these taxes the 
local housing agency pays up to ten per cent of its rent 
collections to local government. In the case of capital 
grants, local governments must provide contributions (in 
almost any form) to the project equal in value to at least 
twenty per cent of the development costs. Finally, the 
local community must contract to eliminate as many unsafe or 
insanitary dwellings in the community as there are new units 
in the housing project. 
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A further subsidy of considerable import is made 
available in the form of below market rate loans for the 
development of low rent projects. These loans may not 
exceed ninety per cent of the development cost in value, 
and they bear interest equal to the going Federal rate plus 
Another direct subsidy is Tenant Service Grants which 
are given to support counselling and advisory programs 
within the projects. An indirect subsidy is made available 
by freeing bonds issued by local housing authorities from 
federal taxation; moreover, annual contributions may be used 
collateral for such bonds. 
Income limits in public housing are set by the local 
authority with the approval of HUD. Rents may not exceed 
twenty-five per cent of the tenant's income nor may they 
exceed eighty per cent of the lowest local rents for 
unsubsidized, standard apartments. In addition to showing 
preference for persons of lowest income, local agencies are 
expected to give first priority to the elderly, veterans, 
large families, and persons displaced by government action. 
Public housing also has strictures and policies 
regarding relocation of persons displaced by public housing, 
rehabilitation as a source of public housing units, 
assurance of the low-rent character of subsidized projects, 
foreclosure and disposal rights of the Federal government, 
and even terms under which public housing may be sold to its 
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tenants. In practice relocation is the only of these of 
real significance, and its role as an impediment is 
partially reflected by the inclusion of relocation costs in 
total development costs. 
In short, public housing involves direct and indirect 
subsidies to local governmental agencies which are shifted 
forward to the tenants of the low-rent housing. These 
subsidies take several forms, and since the size of annual 
contributions are dependent on construction costs, location, 
size of project, rental potential of tenants, and the like, 
these subsidies do not reflect the operating costs of the 
project. 
The Rent Supplement Program subsidizes participants by 
paying any rent obligations in excess of twenty-five per 
cent of the participants* income. When coupled with Section 
236 housing there is the further proviso that the partici­
pant must pay at least thirty per cent of the standard 
minimum rent for his unit. In other contexts, the Rent 
Supplement Program imposes a ceiling on the market rent of 
units embraced by the program, but this does not concern us 
here. 
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CHAPTER IV: MEASURES OF BENEFITS 
Our first task is to settle on a best measure of direct 
tenant benefits. Naive discussion and the existent 
literature suggest several measures for consideration. For 
enlightment on these issues we rely heavily on the careful, 
insightful analysis of Sir John Hicks as presented in his 
Revision of Demand Theory {^5)• 
Housing programs generally yield two distinct kinds of 
benefits. First, participants are made better off because 
the programs allow the purchase of housing services at prices 
below the market price of housing; the benefits from this 
price subsidy are the "direct" benefits of interest in this 
study. Second is a class of less easily defined benefits 
which accrue to society as a whole. Some elements of this 
second class accrue from the altruistic preferences of the 
general popululation; people are, in general, made better off 
when the lot of less fortunate members of society is improved. 
Other elements of this class are due to the general popu­
lation's desire to alter the composition of the poor's 
consumption; housing programs cause participants to consume 
more housing than they would otherwise (and even more than 
they might consume under some cash grant programs). Still 
other elements of this class are due to externalities; public 
l4 
housing may generate neighborhood effects, or may make 
better citizens of its tenants, and these effects redound 
to the benefit of the whole population. 
We leave to others the difficult task of measuring 
these latter, indirect benefits; our concern is with the 
direct benefits to tenants. Our results, however, are not 
without interest to persons concerned with indirect bene­
fits, VTe presume society is both altruistic and interested 
in altering the composition of consumption of its intended 
beneficiaries; this study will identify the extent to which 
programs improve the lot of participants and alter their 
consumption patterns, as well as distinguishing the cost of 
the former from that of the latter. Indeed, it is these 
concerns which enable us to settle on a "best" measure, 
A naive measure of the direct tenant benefits would be 
the difference between the tenants' pre-participâtion rent 
and his program rent, While it is true that most subsidized 
programs do involve a decrease in tenant rents, thus 
allowing participants to purchase more of other goods, this 
is a poor measure as it takes no account of the change in 
the quantity of housing services consumed by the tenant. It 
is entirely possible that a program might involve rents 
higher than those the participants paid outside the program 
and still benefit the tenants positively; the added quantity 
of housing obtained at the higher, subsidized rent might 
easily compensate for the decreased consumption of other 
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goods. Who would not accept the finest house in town for a 
rent one dollar higher than they are currently paying? 
Probably only the family already in that house. 
Prescott ( 2 1 )  and Bish ( 2 )  have used the difference 
between the market rent of the subsidized unit and the 
subsidized rent of the unit to estimate benefits. This 
measure can be viewed as an approximation of the Marshallian 
consumer's surplus measure used by Prescott and Olsen ( 2 0 ) ;  
in another paper (l9) Olsen suggests the Marshallian measure, 
but estimates it with an approximation. 
DeSalvo (II) and Aaron and Furstenberg (1) have suggested 
still another measure, called the equivalent variation. We 
use this measure here. 
The remainder of this chapter compares these measures 
found in the literature and discusses both their relation­
ships, one to another, and our reasons for selecting the 
equivalent variation as the best measure for our purposes. 
Here, and throughout this study, we postulate a two 
commodity world composed of housing services (a bundle 
embracing many elements, including utilities), and a 
composite commodity make up of all other goods and services. 
We will always denote the quantity of housing services by H 
and the quantity of the composite commodity by E; specific 
quantities will be differentiated by superscripts, such as 
with H™ and H®. The prices of H and E will be designated 
n 
and Pg throughout; specific prices will be differentiated by 
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superscript, such as P™ and P®. Xncome is designated Y. 
The greatest constraint imposed by this framework is 
that it requires the relative prices of goods within each 
commodity group to be constant. Such an assumption is 
common and generally necessary to reduce issues to manageable 
proportions. 
¥e note here that "housing services" excludes furniture. 
This could present problems in assessing market rent data if 
we had reason to believe some observations were on furnished 
apartments. However, subsidized units are unfurnished and 
it would seem a prohibitive burden on a low income family to 
move in without furniture and have to obtain it on short 
order. For this reason, we expect few if any of our 
observations to be on furnished units. 
Marshall defined consumer's surplus as the excess of the 
price which he (the consumer) would be willing to expend 
rather than go without the thing, over what he actually does 
pay (17) • Marshall pointed out that this excess would equal! 
the area under the demand curve to the left of the quantity 
purchased less the payment for the commodity, subject to the 
important assumption that the marginal utility of money be 
constant. Thus dLn Fig. 1, if P^ is the market price of 
housing, the quantity to be bought at that price, and D 
the demand function giving P^. as a function of H, then the 
consumer's surplus for this buyer of housing in the market 
place is: 
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Figure 1. Marshallian Consumer's Surplus 
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presuming the marginal utility of money Is constant. To 
measure the benefits to this tenant from a subsidized housing 
g S 
program in which he buys H at a price P^, we simply take the 
change in consumer's surplus from the market position to the 
subsidized position; that is: 
s 
H 
Benefit = g„ D dH + P° h" - P® H®* jjin XX XX 
This is the area A B C D in Fig, 1. 
Clearly, the market rent of the subsidized unit would be 
P™ times ; the difference between this and the subsidized 
rent is B C D E. Thus if demand were perfectly elastic with 
respect to price, the market less subsidized rent measure of 
benefits would equal the Marshalllan measure. The more 
elastic the demand for housing services with respect to price, 
the poorer this measure as an approximation to Marshall's 
measure. 
The housing programs under study do not generally allow 
participants to pick whatever amount of housing they want at 
the subsidized price. In order to alter the pattern of con­
sumption of participants, the programs offer a specific 
quantity of housing services (based on family composition) 
at a given price (based on income). Thus there is no 
assurance that H® will be a point on the tenant's demand 
curve. In practice this offers no difficulty, such a case 
is depicted in Fig. 2, where prices and quantities are to 
be interpreted as in Fig. 1, In Fig. 2 the benefits are 
measured by A B C D E. Vhile there are no practical 
problems here, there are theoretical difficulties, as we 
show later. 
Marshall's measure, then, purports to be the amount of 
money we could take from a person to leave him no better off 
than he was prior to entering the program. This measure is, 
in itself, uninteresting from a policy point of view because 
there is no interest in actually "taxing" participants in 
this fashion. However, the Marshallian measure would be of 
interest if it offered a reliable, simple approximation of a 
more policy oriented benefit measure. We now turn to such a 
policy oriented measure and investigate its relation to the 
Marshallian measure. 
Hick's equivalent variation measure of benefits is 
suggested for housing analysis in De Salvo ( 11 ) and Aaron 
and Furstenberg (l). The measure is the change in income 
which would make the participant just as well as the proposed 
program. This measure is ideally suited for our purposes. 
It tells us in an untuitively appealing way how much better 
off participants in housing programs are made ("It is like 
increasing their incomes x dollars."); it tells us how much 
it would cost to improve the lot of tenants just as much as 
the program does, if we were to forego affecting their 
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Figure 2. Marshall's Measure and Points off the Demand Curve 
consumption pattern (that is, if we let them do as they 
please at market prices rather than assuring their con­
sumption of some one commodity rises); finally, it allows 
us to compare the participants' actual consumption of 
housing with what they would consume if given an equivalent 
cash grant to see how much consumption patterns are altered. 
Moreover, the equivalent measure is much more robust than 
Marshall's measure in cases off the demand curve. 
The following comparison of Marshall's measure with 
that of Hicks, is derived from Chapter X of Hicks' Revision 
of Demand Theory (l5). Hicks discussion is in terms of the 
"compensating variation" and we have transformed the 
arguments appropriately. The points made about points off 
the demand curve are not from Hicks, and we believe they are 
new. 
Por simplicity we begin with the case in which the 
consumer is subjected to no constraints other than his money 
income and either market or subsidized prices. Figure 3 
shows such a case for subsidized housing prices. 
The line YY is the budget line corresponding to initial 
t 
money income and market prices. YY is the budget line 
corresponding to initial money income and subsidized prices; 
the subsidized price of housing, P®, is below the market 
_m 
price, Pjj. 
At initial prices, the consumer maximizes utility at A 
on indifference curve , at subsidized prices the consumer 
E 
Z 
Z' 
K 
Y 
m 
Figure 3» Unconstrained Housing Price Subsidy 
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p. 
H 
1 
Figure 4. The Bounds of the Equivalent Measure 
2k 
maximizes utility at B on the higher indifference curve Ug. 
The line ZZ is the budget line which would just allow the 
1 1 
consumer to buy the bundle B at market prices. Z Z is the 
budget line corresponding to the money income which would 
just allow the consumer, at market prices, to achieve the 
same level of satisfaction attainable under the price 
subsidy. The difference in money incomes between YY (or YY ) 
1 1 
and Z Z is the equivalent measure of benefits. 
Note that the money income corresponding to ZZ is 
1 1 
necessarily greater than that corresponding to Z Z . 
I * In Figure 4, H is the amount of housing services which 
the consumer would obtain if he were given an equivalent 
cash grant in lieu of a price subsidy; is the amount of 
housing services which the consumer would choose under the 
price subsidy, P™ is the market price of housing services 
and Pg is the subsidized price. 
The bundle of goods B in Figure 3> can be bought with 
either the initial income at subsidized prices or with the 
income corresponding to ZZ at market prices. Since in 
either case the same amount is spent on goods other than 
housing (Pg is constant), the difference in these two incomes 
is the difference in the valuation of at market and 
subsidized prices, (P® - P®) H®. This difference is 
necessarily greater than the equivalent measure, and is 
represented by the area P™ d c pf in Figure 4. 
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Now suppose that the equivalent variation in income has 
been granted and market prices maintained. In such a case, 
the consumer is at point a in Figure k. Now consider a 
budget line K K, through c in Figure 3 corresponding to 
subsidized prices (and this parallel and to the right of 
YY'), This budget line corresponds to a money income less 
than that of Z'Z' but greater than that of YY; the difference 
between this money income and that of Z'Z' is (P™ - P®) 
This last difference is represented in Figure 4 by the area 
Py a b P®; but if the money income of KK lies between those 
of Z'Z' and YY, this difference must be less than the 
equivalent measure. Thus we have upper and lower bounds on 
the equivalent measure. 
Now let us consider the points a and c in Figure 4. 
They are, in fact, two points on a compensated demand curve, 
DD. Moreover, if we view the price change from P™ to P® as 
M fi 
made up of an infinite series of small price changes, the 
bounds of the equivalent measure converge to DD. Thus the 
equivalent measure of benefits for unconstrained price 
subsidies is the area P^ a c P^ for the compensated demand 
cuirve through the subsidized position. Now we can show the 
relationship between Marshall's measure and the equivalent 
measure for points on the demand curve. 
In Figure 5 we present the compensated demand curve, DD, 
through (Pg, H®) and the Marshallian demand curve CC on the 
presumption H is a normal good; CC is to the left of DD for 
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H below H® and to the right of DD for H above H®. 
Marshall's measure of the benefits of a fall in price 
from P™ to Pg is the area P^ XZ P®. This is XYZ less than 
the equivalent measure. Thus, for normal goods, Marshall's 
measure is an underestimator of the equivalent measure. For 
inferior goods Marshall's measure would be an overestimator 
of the equivalent measure. All this is subject, of course, 
to the requirement that (H®, P®) be on the consumer's demand 
curves. (in the odd case that there is no income effect, 
Marshall's measure coincides with the equivalent measure.) 
What becomes of this regular relationship between 
Marshall's measure and the equivalent measure if we abandon 
the assumption of unconstrained subsidies? Suppose (H^, P^) 
is below the demand curve as in Figure 2. Marshall's measure, 
in this case, is equal to the benefits from a price fall to 
Pjj plus the area fbcd. Let us consider this subsidy as 
having two parts, first, a price fall to Pg and second, a 
constrained income grant of fbcd (spend it on anything except 
housing). 
For the first part, Marshall's measure underestimates 
the equivalent measure (if H is a normal good); but for the 
second part, Marshall's measure overestimates the equivalent 
measure, because unless I do not wish to spend any added 
income on H, an unconstrained grant of less than fbcd will 
improve my lot by as much as a constrained increase of fbcd. 
Thus, for constrained subsidies of normal goods, there 
27 
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Figure 5. Marshall's Measure and the Equivalent Measure 
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is no general, certain relationship between Marshall's 
measure and the equivalent measure. Since we are dealing 
with constrained subsidies of housing, which is almost 
certainly a normal good, Marshall's measure is of little use 
as an approximation of the equivalent measure. Therefore, 
despite the greater simplicity in application of Marshall's 
measure, we feel it is necessary to attempt a direct measure­
ment of the equivalent variation. 
¥e should note in passing, that if one seeks to estimate 
the equivalent measure from the compensated demand curve 
(presuming it, or a suitable approximation, were available), 
the same problems with regard to points off the demand curve 
would arise as with the Marshallian curve. For this reason, 
we must proceed to obtain an estimate of the consumers 
indifference map or, equivalently, of his marginal rate of 
substitution as a function of H and E. 
An analytic expression for the equivalent measure as a 
function of prices, income, and subsidized quantities is not 
necessarily possible for every valid utility function. 
Fortunately, iterative computer programs can generate 
approximations to any desired degree of accuracy. 
The computer program utilized here uses an estimated 
utility function to identify the indifference map on which 
the subsidized bundle lies and proceeds to search for the 
income which would just enable the consumer to attain that 
same indifference at market prices. The difference between 
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actual income and the income found above is the equivalent 
measure. 
Our tasks in this study follow directly from these 
considerations. We must first confront the task of 
selecting a utility function (or several); next we must 
formulate a proper stochastic model to estimate the param­
eters of this function, and then we must use our estimates 
to approximate estimates of benefits based on our utility 
function parameter estimates. These efforts are taken up 
in the following chapters. 
In summary, we have settled on Hick's equivalent 
variation as our measure of benefits. Thus we are 
implicitly comparing programs to the alternative of an 
income maintenence plan and asking what income subsidy 
would make tenants feel just as well off as the program 
does. We reject Marshall's measure as a useful approxi­
mation chiefly because of that measures inaccuracy in 
dealing with points off the demand curve. 
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CHAPTER V: FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
If we are to estimate the equivalent measure of direct 
tenant benefits for public housing and section 236 housing 
we must first find an appropriate form for the utility 
function. De Salvo (11) and Aaron and Furstenberg (1) rely 
on price and unitary income elasticity estimates found 
elsewhere in the literature to suggest using constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) or Cobb-Douglas utility 
functions. There are two problems with this approach. 
First, elasticity estimates found in the literature are 
for aggregate demand functions, and thus have nothing to say, 
in general, about the parameters of individual utility 
functions. Indeed, the one disaggregated study in the 
literature, by Lee (16), estimated income elasticities of 
much less than one. 
Second, the demand functions used in previous work are 
not generally consistent with classical utility functions. 
For example, a constant income elasticity of greater than 
one will imply that the weighted sum of income elasticities, 
where the weights are budget shares, exceeds unity as income 
rises, in violation of the Engel aggregation condition. 
This is no indictment of these studies, as aggregate curves 
need not satisfy the classical conditions; however, it does 
highlight their inappropriateness for our purposes. 
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Theory sheds little light on the choice of a utility 
function. Most efforts to develop useful functional forms 
have involved searches for manageable traits such as 
linearity and additivity for use in demand theory (l3) or 
takeovers from production theory. The Cobb-Douglas form 
and the CES form are of the latter type. 
Due to its simplicity, the Cobb-Douglas is an attrac­
tive specification. Indeed, we use it in this study for 
this very reason. However, this simplicity implies strong 
restrictions, namely the a priori assertion that price and 
income elasticities are both unitary. 
The CES specification escapes the unitary price 
elasticity, but maintains a unitary income elasticity. In 
order to relax this last restriction, we utilize a general­
ization of the CES which will allow us to test the sensitivity 
of our results to specification changes and, additionally, 
permit a test of the unitary income elasticity hypothesis, 
as the CES function is a special case of the generalized CES. 
Thus, the two functional forms used in this study are 
the Cobb-Douglasi 
n = H* E^ 
and the generalized CES* 
U = (kH° + E*^)™ 
where a, b, c, d, k, and m are parameters and U refers to 
the level of utility. Clearly, c = d = l/m reduces the 
latter form to the CES. 
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The theory of consumer behavior requires the utility 
function to be quasi-concave, at least in the relevant 
region. Per the Cobb-Douglas, this implies a and b must 
both be greater than zero. For the generalized CES the 
implication is that r must be greater than zero while c, d, 
and m share the same sign; for convenience we assume this 
sign is positive. Moreover, for the generalized CES, c and 
d must be less them one unless H and E are appropriately 
bounded. 
These a priori theoretical constraints can be used in 
either of two ways. First, they can be used as additional 
information in the regression in an effort to obtain more 
efficient answers; second, the constraints can be used to 
test hypothesized models. In the light of the data 
restrictions we face, we use the a priori theoretical con­
straints as an integral part of our specification of the 
model. The consequences of this for parameter estimation 
are discussed in Chapter VII. 
Before passing on to the question of a stochastic 
specification of our problem, we should point out the income 
elasticity of housing demand associated with the generalized 
CES; it is ; 
Note if c equals d, the Income elasticity is unitary; thus 
testing the equality of c and d is a test of the unitary 
income elasticity hypothesis. 
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In the next chapter we present the formal stochastic 
specifications used in estimating the Cobb-Douglas anH 
generalized CES utility functions. 
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CHAPTER Vil THE STOCHASTIC MODELS 
A correct specification of the consumer's allocation 
problem is not an easy task, even if we take our two 
commodity world and a particular fonn of the utility function 
as given. However, the starting place is not hard to 
imagine. One begins with the classical maximization 
condition that the ratio of marginal utilities is equated to 
the ratio of prices, subject to the budget constraint. 
For the Cobb-Douglas function this leavest 
PR 
For the generalized CES, on the other hand, we have * 
P kc H°-1 
^ = 2 
While in both cases, we must add; 
T = PgH + PgE. 
Note that if the exponents in Equation 2 are both -1, 
the generalized CES reduces to the Cobb-Douglas case. 
Estimation of the generalized CES, then, allows a test of 
the hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas is the appropriate 
form. 
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¥e will continue using both formulations for two 
reasons. First, it is of interest to see how the Cobb-
Douglas performs as an approximation of the generalized 
CES. The Cobb-Douglas is easier to estimate and permits an 
analytical form of the equivalent measure of benefits* 
B = (^) " - 3 
where y^ is initial income, the market rent of the sub­
sidized unit, Rg the subsidized rent, and B benefits. It 
would be helpful if the Cobb-Douglas offered close approxi­
mation, even under conditions in which we reject the 
hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas were the true functional 
form. 
Our second, less compelling, reason for continuing with 
both forms is that some researchers seem to have strong 
a priori beliefs about the appropriateness of the Cobb-
Douglas hypothesis in a Bayesian sense. While we do not 
share these strong priors, we felt others interested in this 
research might. 
We have not yet made the framework stochastic. In 
doing so we will also confront the simultaneous nature of 
the allocation process. 
The consumer's decision variables are not, in fact, 
marginal utilities; nor is the decision variable the ratio 
of two such items. 
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Taking account of the stochastic element, the simul­
taneous equation model for the Cobb-Douglas function would 
be % 
H = « V _ 
" % 
T = V + V-
Similarly, for the generalized CES we have; in logs* 
InE =s ^ In ^ In /^H\ + Inu + Inu 4 
V—) 
d-1 d d-1 E d-1 
InE = _J_ In - J In + til InE + Ine 5 
1—c d 1 —c E c —1 
T = PjjH + PgE 
The first point to note is that neither of these speci­
fications can yield all the parameters of our utility 
functions» The parameter m does not even appear in the 
latter systejt, and the former system can only yield an 
estimate of the ratio of a to b, not particular values for 
each. However, this should come as no surprise ; it is only 
a reflection of the arbitrary nature of the utility function. 
Subject to the concavity conditions, we can select any values 
for a and b consistent with the estimated ration, and any 
value at all for m. This feature will be the same in all 
specifications of the problem. 
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The second point to note Is that certain non-linear 
relations hold between parameters In different equations. 
For purposes of estimation, the two specifications above 
would have to be rewritten as followsj 
P P E = a_ H + u 
H = ^ V + e 
T = PgS + PgE 6 
for the Cobb-Douglas and* 
InE = ag + Bg In (^) + Wg In + lu u 8 
E 
p 
InH = + Bg In (^) + Wg InE + lu e 9 
E 
T = PjjH + PgE 10 
^E ^E 11 
= 1/Wg 12 
»E = ^ 
for the generalized CES. 
We now go about Imposing the parameter constraints* In 
the case of the Cobb-Douglas function, this Is not difficult. 
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Equation 6 implies 
^  -  ' e  
PgH = T - P„E 
and 
P„E = T - PjjH E 
Thus Equations 4 and 5 can be rewritten as 
E = a_ ^ ~ V + u 
" e  
H = a„ ^  + e 
or, rearranging terms once more, as 
• • S - .  t ' -
" • 'k • • 
Now it only remains to multiply through by P and P , re­
spectively. 
= ;s__ T UP^ 13 
T+*E 
V = ^ 14 
l+a^ 
Ordinary least squares estimation with Equations 13 and 
l4 will yield estimates of ^E/l+a^ and ®H/l+ajj, Moreover, 
these imply estimates of a^ and which meet the con­
straint Imposed by Equation 7* Even under ideal conditions 
these estimates would not be unbiased, but they would have 
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the property of consistency in such an instance. Thus the 
ratio a/b can be equally well estimated by applying ordinary 
least squares to either Equation 13 or Equation l4. 
In the generalized CES case, we proceed little dif­
ferently. We begin by taking anti-logs in Equations 4 and 5, 
This gives I 
, 1 P_ 1 c-1 
E = (% d-1 (^) 1-d (H) d-1 " 1 5  
E 
1 1 d-1 
Pn C-1 C-1 
H = (^) (^) (E) 16 
E 
We now raise both sides of Equation 15 to the (d-l) the 
power and both sides of Equation 16 to the (c-l) the power, 
(4-1) çkA fis, (s-!) * (d-1) 
E = (^) {^ )  
H = (%6) (^) E (:-l) 
'ok' ^Pj.' e 
Dividing by and rearranging terms yields* 
j,2(d-l) = (£1lZ E)2 H 2(c-l) ^(d-l)^(l-c) 
H 
If we allow u e to be represented by w, 
we can take the square roots of both sides of Equation 17 
and rearrange terms to obtain: 
P^E 
H E 18 IHf: _ ck „ (c-2) ^  (2-d) 
Thus we can estimate the parameters of the relation 
Uo 
In = In ~ + (c-2) In H + (2-d)lnE + Inw 
to obtain estimates of the parameters of the "true" system 
represented by Equation 8 through 12, Of course, this same 
specification would have followed directly if we had selected 
the ratio e/H as the decision variable of the household and 
had simply stuck a multiplicative error term onto Equation 
2. 
The purpose of our more tedious development is twofold. 
First, this approach makes the specification of the system 
the same for both particular functional forms of the utility 
function; we generally specify en equation for H, an 
equation for E, the budget constraint, and a series of 
parameter constraints peculiar to the underlying functional 
form of the utility function. 
The second fruit of this roundabout approach is to 
highlight the axbitrariness of any assumptions about the 
distribution Inw. Assuming Inw to be normally distributed 
would imply peculiar distributions for Inu and In e of 
earlier equations, and vice-versa. The implication is that 
strict attention to t tables and F statistics could prove 
very misleading. 
One important point is to note that Equation 18 is not 
amenable to classical least squares estimation; In H and In £ 
are both correlated with the error tenn. To deal with these 
facts, we use the method of instrumental variables which. 
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under Ideal conditions, would yield consistent estimates. 
The instruments used are T, Pg, ^ constant term; 
the difference here between our approach and that of two 
stage least squares is that Pg does not formally appear in 
the model as an exogeneous variable* 
Thus if conditions were ideal, we could obtain con­
sistent estimates of the parameters of both the Cobb-
Douglas and the generalized CES utility functions (or 
actually of the indifference maps these functions imply). 
Unfortunately, errors in the observation of Pg and P^ imply 
that the estimates will not, in fact, be consistent. However, 
we still utilize the method of instrumental variables in the 
generalized CES cas on the assumption that the inconsistency 
due to errors in variables is less than that which would 
arise from the correlation of In H, and In E with In w. 
Before passing on to a discussion of our data we will 
point up a further estimation problem. In Chapter IV we 
remarked that our benefit measure will be a function, 
perhaps a non-analytic function in the parameters of the 
utility function. To avoid the task of finding an analytic 
function for the generalized CES benefit measure, we use an 
iterative computer program to generate approximations to 
within one dollar per year. In this program we use the 
parameter estimates for the Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES 
based on our public housing sample. The fact that our real 
interest is in the benefit measure minimizes the importance 
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of unbiased parameter estimates for the utility functions— 
the characteristic would not generally carry over; on the 
other hand, consistency becomes more important as it is a 
property which is preserved through functional trans­
formations . 
It is important to note that as a program becomes more 
and more efficient, a bias in the estimate of benefits will 
grow in importance. As pointed out in Chapter rv, there is 
an upper bound on the benefits measured for any transfer 
in kind, while there is, in principle, no lower bound. As 
the true benefits approach the upper bound, observations 
in excess of the true value become less and less likely. 
It follows that as estimated benefits grow closer to 
the maximum level, we must be more stringent in specifying 
acceptable standard errors when judging the inefficiency 
of the program in question. 
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CHAPTER VII t THE DATA 
The bulk of our data is from public housing and Section 
236 housing application forms. These forms provide family 
composition, race and age of household head, family income, 
subsidized rent, previous rent (in the case of public 
housing), and the unsubsidized cost of the apartment (in the 
case of 236 housing)* Income and the previous market rent 
of public housing tenants is crucial to estimating the in­
difference relations; these data indicate actual market 
behavior. 
Relative prices of housing and other goods, inter-city 
price indices, and quantity indices are derived from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics' "Three Budgets for an Urban 
Family of Four" (4, 5t 6, 7, 8). These budgets, which are 
compiled semi-annually, give the costs of standardized 
bundles of commodities (including housing services) in each 
of cities. There are separate sets of bundles for each of 
three income classes; since our study is limited to persons 
of low income, we use the standardized bundles associated 
with the lowest cost budget. These estimates of prices must 
be viewed as random variables and are the chief source of 
inconsistency in our estimates. 
Information on the market value of public housing 
units is obtained in two ways. One is to use the ceiling 
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rents set by local housing authorities; this information was 
included in reports sent to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. The second method is to use a regression 
technique used by Olsen (l8); the requisite characteristics 
were obtained from HUD reports (lO). 
Aside from the cross-sectional nature of the study, the 
crudity of the data is the strongest limitation in our 
analysis. The credibility of our results depends on a full 
understanding of the assumptions underlying the use of our 
data. 
Family income and previous rent are data supplied by 
applicants to public housing. There is a definite incentive 
for prospective tenants to understate income* To reinforce 
understated income claims, applicants may also understate 
their previous rent; on the other hand, pride could account 
for some overstatement of previous rent. Of more serious 
concern are the families whose move to public housing is due 
to a sudden drop in income; in these cases previous rent has 
nothing to do with reported present income. Hopefully these 
cases serve to counterbalance under reporting of income. 
Also of concern are applicants who are coming from the homes 
or friends where their rent bore no relation to market 
rentals. Some applications were excluded from our study 
because they gave ob~ious evidence of these deficiencies; 
data were ignored if previous rent exceeded Income or was 
equal to zero. Not all previous rents included utilities 
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as we assume ; the extent of this deficiency is unknown, but 
we feel most low rent units include utilities and that the 
bias introduced is small. In short, the rent income data 
are imperfect, but if this were the worst of our problems, 
we should indeed be glad of it. 
The unsubsidized cost of the apartment should be a good 
measure of the market value of Section 236 units if the 
government is an efficient producer of housing; unfortunately 
it is generally agreed that the unsubsidized cost seriously 
overestimates the market value of Section 236 units. Recent 
investigations by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development have found that market value is approximately 
ninety-one per cent of unsubsidized cost. This is the 
figure we use. 
We obtain a quantity index for housing by assuming that 
a composite bundle called "housing services" exists and is 
appropriately represented by the bundle of services included 
in the BLS study. We further assume that a unit of housing 
serrvices costs the same everywhere in a given market, (This 
assumption is weaker than that of perfect competition.) The 
extent to which poor blacks pay more or less than poor 
whites, or female headed households more or less than male 
headed households, these assumptions are unwarranted and may 
bias our result. Evidence is not strong that these 
differences are so strong as to invalidate our results. 
46 
On these assumptions, dividing the rent of a given unit 
by the rent of the BLS standardized bundle of housing yields 
an index of the quantity of housing searvices yielded by the 
apartment in question. The price of a unit of housing is 
then the rent of the standardized unit. 
An index for the quantity of other goods is similarly 
obtained, and the price is the price of the BLS bundle of 
commodities other than housing. 
These price and quantity measures benefit from the 
narrow social and economic dispersion of our families; 
within a narrow range of incomes expenditure should change 
primarily in quantities of various goods purchased more than 
in kind of goods purchased. 
The market value of subsidized unit s is the single-most 
unreliable datum we have. In the case of Section 236 units, 
we use the ninety-one per cent of the cost of production 
included on the applications of teneuits. For public housing 
we use several estimates, three based on local housing 
authority estimates and one based on a regression equation 
estimated by Olsen (l8)« 
In most cities, local housing authorities set maximum, 
or ceiling rents for their public housing units, according 
to the number of bedrooms. These ceiling rents are 
purportedly the market values of the units, but there is no 
evidence that local authorities have any rigorous method for 
determining these values. Our technique has been to base a 
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aeries of estimates (using inter-city price indices derived 
from the BLS statistics) on the ceilings for each city and 
to select the maximum, minimum, and mean values for each 
apartment size in each city as estimates. 
J\n alternative to these measures is based on the 
regression equation of Olsen estimated in a study of New York 
City rent control. We selected average values for many 
characteristics (such as floor in dwelling occupied), but 
the primary variables were available. The regression 
equation is used to estimate the value of projects as if they 
were located in New York; inter-city price indices derived 
from the BLS statistics are then used to translate the values 
to correspond to the cities in which the projects are 
located. These values are estimated for each apartment size 
in each project appearing in the sample. 
Unlike Section 2^6 units, we feel we have somewhat 
acceptable upper and lower bounds for the benefits to 
tenants insofar as provide reasonable upper and lower bounds 
on market values for public housing units. 
Recent investigations by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development indicate that the cost of public, housing 
units is about one hundred and twenty per cent of their 
market value. This is the figure we use. 
A final note should be made on the size of our sample. 
We have a total of thirteen hundred and eighty-eight 
observations, a considerable number. Even after stratifying 
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the sample by family size and composition (nine classes, in 
all) the samples run from a smallest number of forty-nine to 
a largest of five hundred and fourteen. 
The apartments to be hypothetlcally given to public 
housing tenants under the provisions of Section 236 are 
determined by calculating the average apartment value and 
subsidized rent for each family composition in a large 
sample of actual Section 236 housing tenants. This infor­
mation was obtained from Section 236 applications. 
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CHAPTER VIII, ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
This chapter presents the estimation techniques actually 
used in this study as well as a potential source of bias in 
the benefit estimates. Random regression coefficients and 
inequalities as constraints are the chief estimation issues. 
We assume all households have utility functions of the 
same form but that the parameters vary from household to 
household. The distribution of parameters is assumed to have 
finite mean and variance. 
Thus, the specifications of Chapter VI must be modified. 
Equation l4 becomes* 
V = (-i^  + *°) ? + 20 
or, 
Equation 19 becomesi 
P £/ 
In = (in + ®l) + ((c-2) + ®2) In H 
S 
2 1  
22 
or 
+ ((2-d) + ®3) In E + In w 
P„E 
In = In ^  + (c-2) In H + (2-d) In E + 
(®1 + ®2 In H + In E + In w) 
23 
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In Equations 20-23» the terms g^, g^, g^, g^, are random 
variables with mean zero and finite variance; g^ and g^ are 
then truncated random variables, subject to the theoretical 
constraints on c and d. 
Ordinary least squares applied to Equation 21 or two 
stage least squares applied to Equation 23 yield estimates 
of the mean value of the parameter distributions. The 
estimates are not asymptotically efficient because of the 
heteroskedasticity inherent in random coefficients regression, 
but a generalized least squares approach would require a 
priori knowledge of the variances of the parameters about 
their means. 
The estimation of the mean values of a distribution of 
parameters implies our benefit estimates are for some "mean" 
household. The interpretation of such a measure is best 
viewed asymptotically; consistent parameter estimates would 
imply that our estimate of benefits based on the estimate of 
mean parameters is a consistent measure of benefits. However, 
the distribution of benefits is truncated and this introduces 
additional problems for our benefit measure, given the random 
coefficients framework. (This returns us to a topic touched 
on briefly at the end of Chapter VI.) 
The potential biases introduced by the random coeffi­
cients model can be highlighted by two extreme cases. 
First, consider a constrained price subsidy program which 
places participants without regard to their tastes (indeed. 
each bundle offered in the program is viewed as being held 
by people with the whole gamut of tastes) but such that a 
person with the average function parameters, if given an 
unconstrained cash grant equal to the dollar value of the 
subsidy, would buy the same bundle as he is given under the 
subsidy. Such a program would be said to be "perfectly 
efficient" for a person of average preferences in the sense 
that the equivalent measure of benefits equals the dollar 
value of the subsidy; every "subsidy dollar" becomes a 
"benefit dollar". 
If we use the average utility function parameters to 
estimate benefits in this case, every household will seem 
to share in the perfect efficiency of the program* In 
fact, however, only families with the average utility 
function parameters will evaluate the program so highly, 
all other households will actually value the program less 
than the estimated measure indicates. 
Thus, in this instance we would over-estimate benefits 
other things equal, the larger the variance of the actual 
marginal rates of substitution about their mean, the larger 
the bias in estimating benefits. 
Now consider a second case. An omniscient project 
director gives each participant a bundle which is perfectly 
efficient given the tenants true tastes. However, in 
calculating benefits, we use the mean parameter values for 
all households. In this case, we will underestimate 
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benefits for all tenants except thoae with average pre­
ferences. Participants who are given extra housing because 
of their relatively stronger preference for housing, will be 
Judged as receiving more than the efficient amount of 
housing when the mean parameters are used to measure 
benefits; thus estimated benefits will be below true 
benefits. Participants who are given relatively more of 
other commodities because of their relatively weaker 
preference for housing, will be judged as receiving less 
than the efficient amount of housing when the mean parameters 
are used in their case; thus estimated benefits will be 
below true benefits. 
Thus, in this instance we would underestimate true 
benefits. Moreover, as in the previous case, the larger 
the variance about the mean value of the marginal rate of 
substitution, the larger the bias in estimating benefits 
other things being equal. 
These cases can also be seen if we write the error in 
estimating the benefits to the i^^ household, u^^, as : 
"i = =1 -
where is the true benefits to the i^^ household and B* is 
the estimated benefit. 
If is the subsidy to the i^^ household then B^ and 
* 
B^ are both necessarily less than or equal to If B^^ 
equals for all i, then u^ must be greater than or equal 
* 
to zero for all i; if B^ equals for all i, then u^ must 
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be less than or equal to zero for all i. It is clear that 
* 
the strict inequalities hold unless equals for all 1. 
* 
The equality of and B^ for all 1 implies that all house­
holds are alike and the variance of the marginal rate of 
substitution about its mean is zero; that is, both biases 
disappear when the random coefficients framework collapses 
to the ordinary least squares case, (This presumes no 
stochastic element other than that due to the variation of 
parameters; this assumption allows us to isolate the conse­
quences inherent in our random coefficients framework. 
Random coefficients stochastic terms differ from ordinary 
error terms in that we do not expect their Impact to 
disappear as the sample grows. Ordinary parameter estimates 
converge in probability (hopefully) to the true parameter 
values, yielding consistent if not unbiased estimates of 
benefits even in the extreme cases (so long as all house­
holds are alike); but even in the infinite sample case, 
application of the (consistent) estimate of the mean param­
eter values does not yield consistent benefit estimates (in 
the extreme cases) so long as the mean values are not the 
correct values for every household). 
Is there anythdLng to be learned from this? Clearly, 
the problems are due to the existence of upper bounds for 
* 
Bj^ and B^; hopefully, the problems could be alleviated if 
* 
Bj^ and B^^ are sufficiently less than their maximum values. 
Consider the following case. 
5h 
We assume a constrained housing price subsidy in which 
all households have the same income and receive the same 
bundle of goods, and the distribution of parameters is such 
that every household would purchase less of the subsidized 
commodity if given an equivalent cash grant to spend at 
market prices. Clearly, households with a stronger than 
average preference for housing will be closer to an 
efficient bundle than households with average preferences 
for housing; conversely, households with weaker than average 
preferences for housing will be further from an efficient 
bundle than households with average tastes. But this 
implies that households with average preferences obtain 
smaller benefits than the former group and larger benefits 
than the latter; this introduces the possibility that the 
benefits accruing to the average household may be the 
average benefits. Whether or not this attractive possi­
bility occurs will depend on the distribution of parameters, 
the particular utility function in question, and also the 
bundle of goods and seirvices and their cost. The com­
plexities of this issue are a topic in themselves and we 
will not try to solve them. For our purposes we assume 
that the desired condition is approximated so long as the 
subsidized quantity of housing is "sufficiently" far from 
the quantity of housing which would be bought under an 
equivalent cash grant program by households with mean 
parameter values. However, there are some general points 
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regarding the distribution of the u^ defined in equation 5 
which we feel can be made here. 
First, the truncation of the parameter distribution 
which we assume in the last example is not necessarily the 
moat likely case. It is quite possible that some households 
will have such strong preferences for housing that they 
would in fact buy even more housing if given an equivalent 
cash grant. And if this is so, and the amount more that 
they would buy is large enough, then these households would 
receive smaller, not larger, benefits than households with 
average parameters. However, unless the variance of the 
parameters about their mean is large this factor will 
probably be inconsequential as the subsidized quantity 
becomes larger relative to the quantity which would be bought 
with an equivalent cash grant. 
Second, if our population is that of an actual subsidy 
program, the distribution of parameters will be bounded such 
that all tenants receive positive benefits. These upper and 
lower bounds will vary from program to program. However, we 
believe it unlikely that these "tails" of the distributions 
are of great import ; we believe that the bulk of all popu­
lations will be concentrated densely about the mean values. 
It is a more open question, in our minds, whether the mean 
values themselves alter systematically across populations. 
Our main conclusion then, is that the severity of the 
estimation bias in the measurement of benefits is most 
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* 
severe when or is close to its majcimtun for all i, and 
less severe as they both fall below their maximum values. 
We will now present an indicator for the potential presence 
of these problems. 
Denote the quantity of housing obtained by the ith 
* 
household under a housing price subsidy and the quantity 
of housing which the ith household would consume if given an 
equivalent cash grant on the assumption that the average 
parameters of the utility function are applied in allocating 
the cash grant income. 
B* will equal only if H® equals H*, Thus if B* 
equals for all i, it follows that 
Ei((H* - H*) Ml) = 0 24 
* 
Moreover, if B^ is close to for all i, the left hand side 
of Equation 2k will tend to be small, and the variance of the 
differences about this mean will also be small. 
Now consider the case where is such as to be effi­
cient for all participants, given their true utility function 
parameters. For those cases where the marginal rate of 
* 
substitution is overestimated at the subsidized bundle, 
will be to the right of H®. Por instances in which the 
marginal rate of substitution is underestimated at the 
S  
subsidized bundle will be to the left of These 
results follow directly from the slope of the indifference 
curve being equal to the slope of any equivalent cash grant 
budget line (since is efficient for all i), 
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In this circumstance H* will be less than for some i 
and greater for others. Thus the differences in the left 
hand side of Equation 2k will tend to offset one another. 
Therefore, the left hand side of Equation 24 will again tend 
to be small, but now the variance of the differences about 
their meeui will be relatively large (depending on the 
variance of the parameters about their mean). 
Thus, the larger is the left hand side of Equation 24, 
the less likely a severe bias due to and having upper 
bounds. (The left hand side of Equation 24 being small does 
not imply these biases, it is only a necessary condition. 
To see this, simply consider switching the positions of the 
households whose H® are greater than H* and those whose H® 
* 
are less than the positions are no longer efficient, and 
the bias "disappears", but the left hand side of Equation 24 
is unchanged). 
Fortunately, in our study, the left hand side of 
Equation 24 is generally significantly different from zero, 
and we therefore discount the bias as insignificant. 
In assuming symmetry of the Uj^, we are being heroic. 
However, we have at least made the problems obvious, which 
is in itself an advance over the blythe measurement of 
Marshallian consumers surplus. 
A second statistical technique we use is necessitated 
by the theoretical constraints on the parameters of the 
utility functions. ¥e anticipated before beginning our 
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actual runs that the primitiveness of our data might make it 
difficult to fit the generalized CES without violating prior 
constraints; this proved to be true, for at least some 
family compositions. The Cobb-Douglas, in which the param­
eter estimated only represents an estimate of the average 
budget share spent on housing, poses no such problems. 
To provide a superior estimator we implement a quadratic 
programming technique presented by Takayama and Judge (23). 
This approach allows us to impose inequality constraints on 
the parameters to be estimated while still using a (re­
stricted) least squares criterion for choosing estimates. 
The primary task in this formulation is to translate 
the problem so that all parameters to be estimated are 
greater than zero, a priori. Thus, parameters which theory 
tells us are always negative or which fall between a 
negative and a positive number, or which are greater than 
some negative number, all necessitate translating the 
matrices involved. 
The transformation of the problem is determined as 
follows (23). If: 
(1) y = XB + u 
(2) r= _ B _ r* 
then let* 
C = B - r® where 
The problem is then to minimize 
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C» (X'Xr® - X'T) + i C'X'XC 
Subject to: 
C _ r* - r® 
G _ 0 
The realization that the distribution of parameters is 
of the discrete-continuous sort found in quadratic programming 
should act as a very strong caveat to those who would wish to 
interpret our results in the usual statistical framework. 
Assumptions of normalcy, as contained in our non-quadratic 
formulation, can only be roughest approximations and may even 
be misleading, Takayama eind Judge (23) are careful to point 
out the tenuousness of the properties our estimates will have 
and while the more usual regression framework is still used 
where possible because of its familiarity, we hasten to warn 
the reader to be skeptical. 
To summarize, we are in a random coefficients regression 
framework) we use an approximate generalized least squares 
technique to deal with heteroskedasticity, instrumental 
variables to deal with correlation between independent 
variables and error terms, and a quadratic programming 
technique to account for prior inequality constraints on 
parameters. The quadratic programming approach takes no 
account of the heteroskedasticity, We take no measures to 
account for errors in variables. 
To the extent our assumptions are valid, our estimates 
are only inconsistent to the extent that our price and 
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Income variables are subject to error. This is not an ideal 
situation, but it seems to us to be the best presently-
available. The subsequent chapters present our results and 
an interpretation of their implications. 
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CHAPTER IXI. THE NUMBERS 
This chapter contains the bulk of our numerical results. 
In each case we provide an explanation of the sources and 
techniques used to obtain the numbers. In the next chapter 
we utilize the numbers to formulate tentative answers to our 
research questions. Hopefully, this division of results «nH 
their interpretation will allow a greater clarity than would 
be possible if the explanatory passages were cluttered with 
detailed tables. 
In Chapter VII we explained our prices are based on 
studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In forming 
a price of housing, utilities were excluded. This is based 
on our judgement that most private units do not include 
utilities in rent. Table 1 contains the 1971 costs of the 
standard BLS bundles of housing services and other commodities 
for the seven cities in our sample, as well as the price 
ratios for these cities; PH, PE, and PR indicate the costs 
of the housing bundle, the costs of the other commodities 
bundle, and the price ratio, respectively. 
Pour estimates of the market value of public housing 
units are used in this study. Three of these estimates are 
based on the data in Table 2, Public authorities are often 
required to provide to the Department of Housing and Urban 
62 
Development estimates of the local market value of public 
housing units by number of bedrooms. Table 2 contains such 
estimates for our seven cities (all values are translated to 
1971 prices using the usual BLS indices). Zeroes indicate 
that no estimate was given. It is not known how these 
estimates were generated. 
Each city's data are used (along with the BLS price 
indices) to generate estimates for all other cities. This 
yields seven sets of forty-two estimates each. From these 
we select the minimum and maximum estimates for each apart­
ment size in each city; we also take an average of all 
estimates (correcting for the missing elements in Table 2). 
Tables 3 through 5 contain the resultant estimates of the 
market value of public housing. Implicit in this combina­
torial approach is the assumption that public housing is 
everywhere the same ; the use of upper etnd lower bounds 
affords some protection from errors in this assumption. 
The fourth estimate of the market value of public 
housing is based on the rent versus housing characteristics 
regression equation estimated by Olsen (18). Some 
adaptation was needed since not all of the data required 
were available. 
The summary characteristics of the eighty-six housing 
projects in the study are used to estimate the average 
floor on which a tenant lives, whether or not an elevator 
is available, the number of families in the unit and the 
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Table 1, 197>1 Housing Prices, Other Prices, 
and Relative Prices, by City 
PH PE PR 
Austin 943 5419 . 1740 
Boston l4o4 6421 .2187 
Honolulu 1728 7262  .2380 
Indianapolis 1224 6007  .2038 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 1210 6023  .2009 
Pittsburgh 104? 6031  . 1736 
Washington, D.C. 1366  6134 .2227 
Table 2. Local Estimates of Market Value of Public Housing 
Units by Number of Bedrooms and City 
Ô . 1 2 3 4 5 
Austin 0  106  125 155 0  0  
Boston 93 104 ll4 123  134 l44 
Honolulu 124 147 181 237 301  0  
Indianapolis 87 92 98 128  l4i l4i 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 96  108 150 182  215  228  
Pittsburgh 0  155 169  204 289  0 
Washington, D.C. 106  133 160  187  0  0  
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Table 3. Minimum Estimates of Market Value of Public Housing 
Units by City and Number of Bedrooms 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Austin 62 70 76 83 90 97 
Boston 93 104 112 123 134 l44 
Honolulu 114 128 138 151 165  177 
Indianapolis 81 91 98 107 117  126  
Minneapolis-St, Paul 80 90 97 106 115 124 
Pittsburgh 69 78 84 92 100 107  
Washington, D.C. 90 101 109 120 130  i4o 
Table 4, Maximum Estimates of Market Value of Public Housing 
Units by City and Number of Bedrooms^ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Austin 95 l4o 152 184 260  260  
Boston 111 208 227 274 388  388  
Honolulu 137 256 279 337 477 477 
Indianapolis 97 181 198 238  338 338  
Minneapolis-St, Paul 96 179 195 236  334 334 
Pittsburgh 83  155 169 204 289 289  
Washington, D.C. 108 202 220 266  377 377 
The figures for four and five bedroom units are the same 
because the meiximum values for 4 bedroom units exceeded the 
maximum values for 5 bedroom units; we use the 4 bedroom 
figures for both. The problem arises because only three cities 
gave estimates for five bedroom unit. 
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Table 5* Mean Estimates of Market Value of Public Housing 
Units by City and Number of Bedrooms 
city 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Austin 69 92 108 132 158 128 
Boston 102 137 l6l 196 235 189 
Honolulu 126 168 198 241 290 233 
Indianapolis 90 119 l4o 171 206 165 
Minneapolis-St, Paul 88 118 138 169 203 163 
Pittsburgh 77 102 120 l46 175 142 
Washington, D.C. 99 133 156 191 228 184 
Table 6. Summary of Cobb-Doubles Regressions 
V = (6) / ( i  + #)  ?  + *  
Family Estimated t-Statistic No, of 
Composition Coefficient Observations 
FS10 .334 43.85 514 
FS20 .296 26.29 l4o 
FS21 .320 26.24 164 
FS31 .314 13.87 70 
FS32 .343 26.98 149 
FS42 . 261 11.36 49 
FS43 .324 21,87 119 
FS54 .323 20.36 107 
FS65 .283 22.54 76 
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like. The market value of a tenant's unit is then dependent 
on the city and project in which he lives and the number of 
bedrooms in his unit. This estimate only approximates the 
true 01 s en measure, but it prcides an attractive check on 
the other three measures, (The usual BLS index is used to 
translate estimates from 1968 New York prices to 1971 prices 
in other cities,) 
Olsen's regression contained variables for number of 
bedrooms, condition, period of construction, floor (with or 
without elevator), burrough, number of other units, and state 
of furnishing. ¥e assumed all public housing units are 
standard, in an "average" burrough (average the burrough 
variables), unfurnished, and have an elevator if more than 
three stories tall. The number of stories is obtained by 
dividing the number of units by eight, and for a given unit, 
the number of stories is the average number for the project. 
Period of construction, number of bedrooms, and number of 
other units are all known. Projects with over one hundred 
units were assumed to be sets of twelve story high rises. 
The limitations of this approach are obvious; the close 
fit of Glsen and mean measures of value supports the hypoth­
esis that the errors tend to cancel. 
The Cobb-Douglas can be estimated without reference to 
the BLS data. Market rent is simply regressed against 
income, as explained in Chapter VI, Table 6 contains the 
product of nine Cobb-Douglas regressions, one for each 
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family composition in the study. Family compositions are 
denoted by two numbers (the first, the number of persons in 
the family; the second, the number of minors in the family) 
prefixed by the letters PS. Thus FS43 indicates a four 
person household with three minors. 
The generalized CES requires a distinction between 
quantities and prices. As we have explained in Chapter VII, 
quantities are measured dLn units of the BLS standard bundle, 
and the prices of housing per unit are the prices in Table 1. 
Division of market rent by the "price of housing" yields the 
quantity of housing. Table 7 contains the summary statistics 
and parameter estimates for the nine unconstrained generalized 
CES regressions. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The estimates for FS20 and FS21 imply negative C's; 
this is not permissable. For these cases we constrained the 
estimate of (C-2) to be greater than or equal to -1.9. The 
estimates for FS32 and PS42 prove to violate the convexity 
conditions within the relevant range of H and E. For these 
cases we constrain the estimate of (2-d) to be 1.01 or 
greater. The results of these constrained estimations are 
to be found in Table 8. Since the properties of estimators 
such as these are unknown, we exclude summary statistics. 
Tables 9 and 10, respectively, present the estimated 
Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES utility functions for each 
family composition. These functions are used as part of an 
iterative computer program for approximating public housing 
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Table 7« Summary of Unconstrained Generalized CES Re­
gressions 
In (Pg e/PJ^) = in (^°/d) + (c-2)ln H + (2-d)ln E + in u 
Family . No. of 
Comp. ln( /d) (c-2) (2-d) Obs. 
FS10 — 1  •  61 -1  .uu 3.11 514 
(-46) ( -28)  (53) 
PS20 — 1  •  89 —2» 80  1 .38  l4o 
(-5.69) ( -1 .87)  (3 .82)  
FS21 -2.29 -3.22 1.13 l64 
(-4.50) (-1.99) (5.63) 
FS31 -1.87 — 1  •  81 .904 70  
(-5.45) (-2.14 (7.77) • 
FS32 -1.62 — 1.  06  .98 149 
(-59) (-7.82) (31) 
PS42 -1.79 -1.43 .87 49 
(-17) ( -6 .1 )  (16)  
PS43 -1 .58  — e 83 .94 119  
(-48) (-10.3) (49) 
PS54 1  •  62  -.965 .919 107  
( -57 .6 )  (-18.4) (37) 
PS65 — 1*6 -1.4 1 .03  76 
(-28) ( -6 .1 )  (12.5) 
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Table 8. Constrained Generalized CES Regressions 
In (PgE/PgH) = In (kc/d) + (c-2)ln H + (2-d)ln E + In u 
Family 
Composition Constraint ln(kc/d) (c-2) (2-d) 
PS20 (c—2) = — 1•9 -1.74 -1.9 1 .19  
PS21 (c-2) = -1.9 -1.94 -1.9 1.02 
PS32 (2-d) = 1.01 -1.56 -1.001 1 .01 
PS42 (2-d) = 1.01 -1.54 —1. 006  1.01 
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Table 9» Cobb-Douglas Utility 
Functions by Family 
Composition 
Family Utility Function 
Comp. 
FS10 U H. 334  X ^.666 
FS20 U = H. 296  X 
FS21 U = JJ. 32  X 
FS31 U ^ •314  X E.686 
FS32 U - H. 343  X  E- 657  
FS42 U = H. 261  X E -739  
FS43 U = H. 324  X E -37*  
FS54 U = a -323  X E '<77  
FS65 U — B' 283  X e- 717  
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Table 10, Generalized CES Utility-
Functions by Family Composition 
Family 
Comp. 
Utility Function 
FS10 TJ (.03H'^ + E'9)'G 
FS20 U = + E*®)*® 
FS21 U (1.5H'^ + E'99)'* 
FS31 U (.82H*^ + 
FS32 U = (.21H'999 + E"99)'^ 
FSk2 U = (.2in'994 ^ E"99)'^ 
FS43 U = 
PS54 U + El-OS)'3 
FS65 U = (.33H*^ + E'97)"® 
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tenant benefits from public housing, section 236 housing, 
and section 236 housing with rent supplement. 
Pour separate sets of estimates of public housing 
tenant benefits from public housing are developed using the 
four estimates of the market value of public housing. 
Tables 11 through l4 present, in order, the estimated 
benefits, by family composition, using the Olsen, mean, 
minimum, and maximum estimates of the market value of public 
housing. Each table contains benefit estimates based on the 
Cobb-Douglas and generalized CES utility functions, the 
subsidy from government on the assumption that the cost of 
public housing is equal to its market value, and the subsidy 
from government based on the more acceptable assumption that 
government cost exceeds market value (here we assume cost 
is one hundred and twenty per cent of market valuej this 
figure is based on recent unpublished research by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (24). Each 
table gives a sample mean, based on the 1388 observations 
in this study. 
It also proves helpful to have all benefits reduced to 
constant dollars. The base selected is 1971 Washington, 
D.C. prices. It is these benefits which are used in 
analyzing the distribution of benefits. Table 15 through 
18 present constant dollar benefits for the four measures of 
the market value of public housing. Also included in this 
table is the standard deviation of the benefits about the 
family composition means. 
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Table 11. Nominal Benefits from Public Housing - Olsen Measure 
Family Benefits/mo. Benefits/mo, Subsidy/mo. Subsidy/mo. 
Comp. C - D Gen. CES Cost=1.2 Tal. Cost = Tal. 
FS10 48.19 27.62 74.19 55.28 
FS20 68.69 68.63 112.79 85.29 
FS21 61.68 63.99 113.46 84.44 
FS31 97.56 88.63 152.47 117.08 
FS32 85.93 92.63 135.77 103.56 
FS42 94.90 107.70 165.20 126.71 
FS43 104.54 82.12 166.91 128.80 
FS54 126.82 125.38 193.58 151.03 
FS65 123.66 133.23 204.68 159.43 
Sample 75.00 66.85 120.68 91.86 
Mean 
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Table 12, Nominal Benefits from Public Housing - Minimum 
Measure 
Family Benefits Benefits Subsidy Subsidy 
Comp. C - D Gen. CES Cost=1,2 Val, Cost=Val. 
PS10 51 .47  27.88 77 .06  57 .68  
FS20  44 ,80  46 .95  72.22 51 .49  
FS21  32 .95  37 .24  61.56 41 .19  
FS31  47 .43  48 .76  76.00 53 .36  
FS32  40 ,94  35 .99  65 .71  45 .17  
FS42  41 ,34  33 .34  71 .00  48 .20  
f s43  45 .30  11 .33  71 .68  49 .44  
FS54  52.37 34 .25  78 .08  54 .78  
FS65  48 ,90  49 ,87  75 .91  52 .12  
Sample 46 .22  33 .26  72 .73  51 .67  
Mean 
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Table 13. Nominal Benefits from Public Housing - Maximum 
Measure 
Family Benefits/mo« Benefits/mo. Subsldy/mo. Subsldy/mo» 
Comp. C - D Gen. CES Cost=1*2 Val. Cost = Val. 
FS10 82.34 31.85 132.49 103.87 
FS20 109.13 103.81 195.40 154.13 
FS21 94.63 93.22 184.66 143.77 
FS31 130.65 113.73 215.41 169.53 
FS32 115.52 138.15 192.27 150.64 
FS42 121.02 153.96 223.93 175.65 
FS43 131.86 125.51 222.97 175.51 
FS54 154.44 168.76 248,80 197.05 
FS65 153.93 171.79 275.63 218.55 
Sample 107.49 92.35 183.23 143.99 
Mean 
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Table l4. Nomljial Benefits from Public Housing - Mean Measure 
Family Benefits/mo. Benefits/mo. Subsldy/mo. Subsldy/mo. 
Comp* C - D Gen. CES Cost=1,2 Val. Cost = Val. 
PS10 64.63 29.48 97.98 75.11 
FS20 0
 
00
 
70.79 115.62 87.65 
FS21 59.79 62.61 108.45 80.27 
PS31 87.49 80.83 134.82 102.37 
FS32 76.54 78.99 119.00 89.58 
FS42 82.49 87.51 139.62 105.39 
PS43 90.05 62.02 I4O.35 106,66 
FS54 108,11 98.80 159.96 123.01 
FS65 104.70 110.29 165.85 127.07 
Sample 75.42 55.21 118.60 90.14 
' Mean 
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Table 15» Constant Dollar Benefits from Public Housing -
1971 Wash., D.C. Prices 
01sen Measure 
Family Benefits/mo« Stnd. Dev. Benefits/mo. Stnd, Dev. 
Comp. C - D G - D Gen. CES Gen. CES 
PS10 46.14 19.44 27.62 12.03 
FS20 66.26 20.03 66.26 18.87 
PS21 61.68 29.35 63.99 27.43 
PS31 90.28 32.60 82.63 22.63 
PS32 86.48 24.36 92.86 33.80 
PS42 126.63 28.91 101.33 47.38 
PS43 103.30 25.70 79.63 47.47 
PS54 125.79 21.27 123.77 39.55 
PS65 123.24 20.93 132.75 24.57 
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Table l6. Constant Dollar Benefits from Public Housing -
1971 Wash,, D.C. Prices 
Minimum Measure 
Family Benefits Stnd. Dev. Benefits Stnd» Dev. 
Gomp. C - D C - D Gen. CES Gen. CBS 
FS10 48.70 15.24 27.88 12.06 
PS20 42.96 16.47 45.08 16.80 
FS21 32.95 24.37 37.24 25.43 
FS31 43.13 28.10 44.76 22.37 
FS32 41.02 25.49 35.72 29.47 
FS42 38.21 22.91 29.42 36.03 
FS43 44.42 23.43 9.90 38.56 
FS54 51.70 23.14 33.16 25.27 
FS65 48.49 21.44 49.48 22. 17 
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Table 17* Constant Dollar Benefits from Public Housing -
1971 Wash., D.C. Prices 
Maximum Measure 
Family Benefits/mo. Stnd, Dev. Benefits/mo. Stnd. Dev. 
Comp. C - D C - D Gen. CES Gen. CES 
FS10 78.72 24,64 57.68 12.02 
FS20 105.51 22.84 100.48 16.12 
FS21 94,63 29.76 93.22 25.08 
FS31 121.38 37.05 106.53 21.79 
FS32 116.30 24, 16 138.67 33.81 
FS42 115.78 29.08 145.93 50.78 
FS43 130.50 26.57 122.35 52.66 
FS54 153.21 22.54 166.80 42.56 
FS65 153.44 27.31 171.17 31.26 
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Table 18* Constant Dollar Benefits from Public Housing -
1971 Wash., D.C, Prices 
Mean Measure 
Family Benefits/mo. Stnd. Dev. Benefits/mo. Stnd. Dev. 
" Oomp. C - D G - D Gen. CES Gen. CES 
FS10 61.45 15.72 29.48 11.99 
PS20 68.53 17.19 68.31 16,18 
PS21 59.79 25.95 62.61 25.52 
PS31 80.75 31.20 75.20 22.25 
PS32 76.94 23.60 79.03 31.35 
PS42 78.29 24.68 81.82 42.47 
PS43 88.90 23.51 59.81 44.04 
PS54 107.24 20.93 97.29 38.05 
PS65 104.29 19.38 109.83 21.69 
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To estimate the benefits public housing tenants would 
receive from Section 236 housing and Section 236 with Rent 
Supplement, we must decide how much housing the tenants 
would be given and what rents they would pay under the two 
programs. To determine rents requires knowing the amount 
which would cover costs on the given apartment presuming a 
one per cent mortgage (this is the minimum rent in Section 
236 housing), 
These figures were estimated by averaging the quantity 
of housing given to each family, household composition by 
household composition, in a sample of 1,205 actual Section 
236 housing tenants, and by averaging the fraction of the 
market value of the occupied unit paid as rent by all 
observations in the sample which pay in excess of twenty-five 
per cent of their income in rent (these families are paying 
the minimum allowable rent), again, family composition by 
family composition. Table 19 presents the estimated number 
of BLS standard housing units given to each family 
composition, and the estimated fraction of market value paid 
as rent by same. 
Thus, public housing tenants of each family composition 
are assigned a quantity of housing services, based on the 
amount received by their Section 236 counterparts, and are 
expected to pay as rent at least the smallest rent allowed 
these same counterparts. With the rent supplement provision, 
a ceiling rent equal to 25 per cent of income is also imposed. 
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Table 19. Housing Granted and Minimum 
Rent Paid In Section 236 Housing 
Family Amount of Minimum 
Composition Housing Rent (as 
fraction 
of value) 
fs10 1.77 .63 
ps20 1.82 .65 
ps21 1.84 .  66 
ps31 2 .00 .68 
ps32 2.06 .66 
ps42 2.  10 .66 
ps43 2.15 .67 
ps54 2 .  13 .69 
ps65 2.39 .60 
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In Section 236 housdLng, according to recent unpublished 
research by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment (24), the market value of units Is approximately 
ninety-one per cent of the full cost rent of the unit (where 
full cost Includes maintenance costs). Tables 20 and 21 
present the estimated nominal benefits to public housing 
tenants If they were to shift to Section 236 housing and 
Section 236 housing with Rent Supplement as outlined above. 
Table 22 presents constant dollar benefits from Section 236 
housing with Rent Supplement; again, the base is 1971 
Washington, D.C. prices and the standard deviations are 
included. 
Table 23 lists the differences, expressed as a faction 
of pre-program housing, between the amount of housing ob­
tained in public housing, H®, and the amount which would be 
obtained under an equivalent cash grant, H*, for each of the 
four estimates of the value of public housing, using the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Table 2k does the same but 
for the generalized CES utility function. Table 25 contains 
this info37matlon for Section 236 with Rent Supplement using 
both utility functions. 
Table 26 lists the Increase in housing consumed by 
public housing tenants expressed as a fraction (in excess) 
of original consumption, for all four measures of the 
market value of public housing. This table also lists the 
change In the consumption of other commodities expressed as 
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Table 20. Nominal Benefits to Public 
Housing Tenants If Put Into 
Section 236 Housing 
Family Benefits/mo. Subsldy/mo, 
Comp. C - D 
FS10 
-51.89 98.09 
PS20 —18*82 92.47 
PS21 -27.65 88.02 
PS31 -32.24 99.24 
PS32 -25.50 96.62 
PS42 — 18*26 105.68 
PS43 -25.00 103.14 
PS54 -36.04 102.68 
PS65 8.o4 130.60 
Sample 
Aug 
-4l.4l 96.45 
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Table 21. Nominal Benefits to Public Housing 
Tenants If Put into Sec. 
236 with Rent Supp. 
Family Benefits/mo. Benefits/mo. Subsidy/mo. 
Comp. C - D Gen. CES 
PS10 111.76 29.77 184.37 
PS20 98.22 95.04 167.53 
PS21 100.94 97.29 166.4l 
PS31 119.68 104.08 186.68 
PS32 120.15 148.08 183,04 
PS42 99.14 135.56 181.02 
FS43 124.96 122.l4 194.75 
FS54 134.73 151.33 203.81 
PS65 123.50 143.25 207.82 
Sample 
Aug. 
113.40 87.90 181.08 
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Table 22. Constant Dollar Benefits to Public Housing 
Tenants from Section 236 with Rent Supplement -
1971 Wash., D.G. Prices 
Family Benefits Stnd. Dev. Benefits Stnd. Dev. 
Comp. 0 - D C - D Gen. CES Gen. CBS 
PS10 106.65 48.28 29.10 10.86 
PS20 95.37 47.22 92.36 14.67 
FS21 100.94 46.35 97.29 18.07 
PS31 112.44 47.08 98.46 24.03 
PS32 120.92 47.32 148.71 30.00 
PS42 94.85 49.25 128.27 42.28 
PS43 123.61 45.03 119.07 47.07 
PS54 133.73 48.71 149.62 35.91 
FS65 123.06 47.38 142.79 19.75 
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Table 23. DIP = for Public Housing 
and the Cobb-Douglas Utility Function 
Family DIP DIP DIP DIP 
Comp. (Olsen) (Min. ) (MaJC.) (Mean) 
PS10 .33 .35 a 96 .56 
PS20 .74 .22 1.60 .76 
PS21 .80 .33 1.55 .77 
PS31 .68 .07 1.26 .54 
FS32 .71 .13 1 .22 .56 
PS42 .96 .15 1.49 .72 
PS43 .86 .11 1.34 .65 
PS54 1.00 .06 1.28 .72 
PS65 1.21 .16 1.82 .87 
88 
Table 24. DIP = (H®-H*)/b™ for Public Housing 
and the Generalized CES Utility Function 
DIF DIP DIP DIP 
Family (Olsen (Min. (Max. (Mean 
Comp. Meas.) Meas.) Meas.) Meas.) 
FS10 .55 .59 i.4o 
00 00 
.
 
PS20 .83 .43 1.93 .96 
PS21 1.00 .40 1.91 .97 
PS31 1.23 .40 1.97 1.06 
PS32 .11 — « 30 .40 .03 
PS42 -.23 —. 83 . 14 -.41 
PS43 —1.81 -1.92 -1.93 -1.83 
PS54 .86 -.37 1.39 .53 
PS65 1.60 .29 2.32 1.19 
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Table 25. DIP = for 
Section 236 with. Rent Supplement 
DIP 
Family Cobb- DIP. 
Comp. Douglas Gen. CES 
PS10 1.95 2.56 
PS20 1.69 1.97 
PS21 1.51 1.89 
PS31 1.42 2.07 
PS32 i.4o .60 
PS42 1.61 .27 
PS43 1.42 -1.92 
PS54 l.4u 1.36 
PS65 1.65 2.03 
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Table 26, HCHNG = and ECHNG = 
(E®-E™)/e° for Public Housing 
Family 
Comp» 
HCHNG 
(Olsen) 
HCHNG 
(Min) 
HCHNG 
(Max) 
HCHNG 
(Mean) 
ECHNG 
PS10 .67 .71 1.53 1.01 .018 
PS20 1.10 .58 2.14 1.13 .013 
PS21 1.12 .52 2.04 1.09 .011 
PS31 1.32 .51 2.05 1.15 .018 
PS32 1.20 .41 .
 
GO
 
0\
 
1.02 .016 
PS42 1.46 .47 2.08 1.18 .013 
PS43 1.42 .42 2.03 1.15 .014 
PS54 1.74 .50 2.33 1.38 .013 
PS65 1.74 .44 2.46 1.33 .010 
Sample 
Mean 
1.09 .57 1.89 1.10 .014 
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a fraction (in excess) of original consumption. Table 27 
contains this information for Section 236 housing with Rent 
Supplement. 
The final group of numbers of particular interest are 
the regressions involving the constant dollar benefits of 
Tables 15 through 18 and Table 22 and the attributes of the 
recipients. These investigations uncover the distribution 
of real benefits among the participants. 
Table 28 contains the estimated coefficients of income, 
race, and age (the latter two being represented by dummy 
variables), from a regression involving only these variables 
as independent variables and the benefit measures from Tables 
15 through 18. The age variable distinguished heads of 
household below 62 years of age (value, zero) from heads 62 
years of age or older (value, one). The race variable dis­
tinguished non-whites (value, zero) from whites. Summary 
statistics are included. 
Table 29 contains the same data as Table 28 for a 
regression in which family composition dummies were included 
as independent variables. Table 30 is similar to Table 29 
but for the addition of city of residence dummies. 
Tables 31 through 33 are analogous to Tables 28 through 
30 but present results using the constant dollar benefits 
from Table 22 as the dependent variables. 
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Table 27. HCHNG = (H®-H°)/h" and ECHNG 
(E®-E°)/e™ for Section 236 Housing 
with. Rent Supplement 
Family 
Comp. HCHNG ECHNG 
FS10 2.69 .015 
PS20 00
 
.010 
PS21 2.02 .014 
PS31 2.15 .016 
FS32 2.04 .015 
FS42 2. 12 .008 
FS43 2,06 .012 
FS54 2.25 .009 
FS65 2. 17 .006 
Sample 
Aug 
2.32 .013 
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Table 28, Distribution of Public Housing Benefits by Income 
(Y), Age (62+), and Race (w)^ 
Mkt. Value Util, Function Y 62+ W F 
01 s en C - D .012 
(.0008) 
-24.7 
(1.9) 
22.2 
(7.1) 
195 • 30 
01 sen Gen. CES .006 
(.001) 
-39.5 
(2.3) 
36.8 
(8.7) 
157 .25 
Minimum C - D .007 
(.0005) 
, "91 
(1.2) 
,8.7 
(4.5) 
74 .14 
Minimum Gen. CES -.007 
(.0007) 
-5.9 
(1.45) 
21.5 
(5.5) 
49 .10 
Maximum C - D .016 
(.0008) 
-14.2 
(1.8) 
18.8 
(6.9) 
218 .32 
Maximum Gen. CES .012 
(.0013) 
-56.7 
(2.8) 
44.2 
(10.6) 
247 .35 
Mean C - D .005 
(.0006) 
-8.7 
(1.5) 
12.0 
(5.6) 
48 .09 
Mean Gen. CES .002 
(.0009) 
-29.1 
(2.11) 
30.2 
(7.5) 
99 .18 
^Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 29. Distribution of Public Housing Benefits bj»- Income 
(y)t Age (62+), and Race (w) — Family Composition Included^ 
Mkt. Value Util. Function Y 62+ V F 
01 s en C - D -.002 
(.00007) 
6.0 
(2.0) 
12.6 
(5.3) 
204 .62 
Olsen Gen. CES -.014 
(.0008) 
6.6 
(2.1) 
16.4 
(5.7) 
280 .69 
Minimum C - D -.011 
(.0006) 
,7.5 
(1.5) 
6.9 
(4.2) 
49 .28 . 
Minimum Gen. CES -.014 
(.0007) 
6.7 
(1.7) 
10.8 
(4.7) 
74 .37 
Maximum C - D .006 
(.0008) 
,9.1 
(2.2) 
11.5 
(5.9) 
.135 .52 
Maximum Gen. CES -.014 
(.0009) 
7-11 
(2.2) 
11.6 
(6.0) 
491 .80 
Mean C - D -.003 • 
(.0007) 
8.3 
(1.7) 
8.3 
(4.7) 
78 .38 
Mean Gen. CES -.014 
(.0007) 
6.99 
(1.9) 
11.0 
(5.2) 
200 .62 
4 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors* 
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Table 30. Distribution of Public Housing Benefits by Income (T). Age (62+), and Race (¥) - Family 
Composition and City Jncluded^ 
Mkt. Value Util, Function Y 62+ ¥ F R^ 
01 s en C - D .011 
(.0006) 
3.3 
(1.7) 
8.3 
(4.6) 
207 .72 
01 sen Gen. CES -.011 
(.0007) 
3.9 
(1.84) 
11.51 
(4.91) 
274 .77 
Minimum C - D 
00 
0
 
0
 0
 
0
 0
 
•
 
•
 
1 
'
 
4.3 
(1.0) 
3.6 
(2.75) 
180 .69 
Minimum Gen. CES -.01 1 
(.0005) 
4.4 
(1.3) 
6.82 
(3.7) 
131 .62 
Maximum C - D .010 
(.0008) 
,5.3 
(1.9) 
7.8 
(5.1) 
l44 .64 
Maximum Gen. CES -.01 1 
(.0008) 
4.30 
(1.99) 
6.61 
(5.3) 
449 .85 
Mean C - D .008 
(.0005) 
4.6 
(1.3) 
4.8 
(3.5) 
154 . 66 
Mean Gen. CES -.01 1 
(.0006) 
4.3 
(1.6) 
6.47 
(4.3) 
232 .74 
^Figures In parentheses are standard bttotb. 
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Table 31 « Distribution of 
236 Housing with 
Income (T), Age 
Tenant Benefits from Section 
Rent Supplement by 
(62+), and Race^ 
Util. Function T 62+ W F R^ 
C - D 
Gen. CES 
.004 
(.0005) 
.003 
(.001) 
-4.8 
(1 .0)  
.64.4 
(2.5) 
-4.9 
(3.9) 
41.9 
(9.6) 
58 .11 
280 .38 
^Figures In parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 32. Distribution of Tenant Benefits from Section 
236 Housing with Rent Supplement by Income (T), Age 
(62+), and Race - Family Composition Included 1 
Util. Function T 62+ W F R^ 
C - D 
Gen. CES 
.004 
(.0005) 
- .02 
(.0006) 
2.3 
(1 .2 )  
1.64 
(1.55) 
-2.9 
(3.2) 
5.91 
(4.17) 
88 .41 
966 .89 
Figures In parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 33» Distribution of Tenant Benefits from Section 
236 Housing with Rent Supplement by Income (y). Age 
(62+), and Race - Family Composition and City Included 
Util, Function Y 62+ V F R^ 
C - D .004 1.7 -7.6 100 .55 
(.0004) (1.1) (2.8) 
Gen. CES -.020 2.0 .58 731 .90 
(.006) (1.5) (3.9) 
^Figures In parentheses are standard errors. 
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CHAPTER XI CONCLUSIONS 
It Is the academician's mark to ignore the aphorism 
about simple answers for simple questions a The basic 
questions in this study are simple ones: what are the 
direct benefits to public housing tenants from several 
alternative programs; how are these benefits distributed. 
The answers to these questions are not simple, and even more 
sadly, they are not entirely clear cut. However, in this 
chapter we attempt to formulate tentative answers to the 
questions based on the machinations of the last nine 
chapters. First we will present our results, then we will 
point out some of their limitations. 
Choice of a best estimate of tenant benefits from public 
housing oould be a problem since we have four different 
measures of the market value of subsidized units and two 
indifference maps. Fortunately, the two most attractive 
measures, the Olsen measure and the mean measure display a 
remarkable degree of agreement.. (The minimum and maximum 
measures are only intended for use as upper and lower bounds 
on the market value and are, therefore, not so attractive as 
the other two measures.) 
The use of two different utility functions highlights 
the speculativeness of work such as this. The comparison 
of public housing- with the other programs is not greatly 
affected by the change in utility functions; however, the -
actual benefit estimates are definitely affected. The 
generalized CES function implies benefits 11 to 28 per cent 
lower than the Cobb-Douglas for the sample averages. 
The 28 per cent drop in sample benefits from Section 
236 with rent supplement in going from the Cobb-Douglas to 
the generalized CES starkly shows the risks involved in 
presuming aggregate elasticities are applicable to persons 
of low income. If the Cobb-Douglas is the correct 
functional form in analyzing one person households, then 
Section 236 housing with Rent Supplement yields, on average, 
$0.62 in tenant benefits for every dollar spent by society, 
while if the generalized CES is a better specification, 
benefits average only $0.15 on the dollar! 
The estimates for the parameters of the generalized CES 
lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that the true 
functional form is the Cobb-Douglas for every family 
composition save FS32 and PS42. However the latter are 
both eases in which the inequality constraints were imposed. 
Since we expect the statistical distortions introduced by 
the constraints are probably most severe in the neighborhood 
of the boundaries, we cannot place much surety in the failure 
to reject the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis in these cases. 
More significant is the result that the Cobb-Douglas 
function does not seem a useful approximation of other forms. 
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It seems likely that public housing tenants would 
prefer to be in Section 236 housing with Rent Supplement 
than in public housing. There is almost no doubt, on the 
other hand, that public housing tenants would suffer 
greatly if transferred to Section 236 housing without rent 
supplement. Table 20 records a #4l,4l loss to public housing 
tenants from Section 236 housing as a sample average. The 
losses would be even greater under the generalized CES 
utility function. 
Some households would have to pay rent in excess of 
their income in Section 236 housing. ¥e arbitrarily assigned 
the losses in these cases to be equal to the household's 
income. Since such a scheme would invite starvation, we 
feel such an assignment of loss not to be excessive. Of 
course, the averages mask the fact that some households 
would gain from a move to Section 236 housing; however, the 
point remains that Section 236 housing cannot searve by 
itself as a suitable substitute for public housing. 
Section 236 housing so clearly fails as a substitute 
for public housing that we do not give it any more attention. 
However, one significant point arises from a comparison of 
Section 236 housing with Section 236 with Rent Supplement. 
Note that in Table 10 the sample average benefits rise 
from -41 to 113 dollars while the subsidy rises from 96 to 
181 dollars. This means that 85 dollars of rent supplement 
subsidy yield ^kk dollars in benefits 1 
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Rent supplements are constrained cash grants which would 
seem never to be preferred, by the recipient, to an equal 
(or greater) unconstrained cash grant. Yet in the move from 
Section 236 housing to Section 236 with Rent Supplement, the 
supplements seem equivalent to an unconstrained cash grant 
greater than themselves. To understand what is happening 
here we have to realize that the recipient is now moving 
from an unconstrained position to a constrained one, but 
from one constrained position to another. 
In Section 236 houfing, the tenant is given more 
housing than he himself would buy with the subsidy; however, 
as he is given additional constrained cash grants in the 
form of rent supplements (The constraint is artificial; the 
tenant is forbidden to buy more housing, a commodity he 
already has relatively too much of and does not care to buy 
more of until he first gets more of other goods.), the 
previous constraint becomes less bothersome; at a new, 
higher income, the excessive amount of housing he receives 
from the program does not seem like so much too much, and 
the previous dollars of subsidy bring him more benefit than 
previously. 
The point is that marginal benefits may exceed the 
marginal subsidy which generated them. Consider a house­
hold which will always try to spend one quarter of its 
income on housing. If government provides such an 
individual with one dollar's worth of housing and three 
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dollar's worth of other goods, the benefits equal the 
subsidy, four dollars. If government gives the person 
only one dollar's worth of housing, the benefits fall short 
of the subsidy; now an added three dollars of other goods 
will raise benefits from below one dollar to four dollars, 
an increase in excess of the increased subsidyI 
The chief significance of this is in viewing the 
effective tax rates associated with some subsidies. If the 
rent paid by tenants rises $0,25 for every additional dollar 
of income, the typical response is to view the effective tax 
rate as 25 per cent. In fact, this may be, and probably is, 
incorrect. The income of a subsidy recipient should be the 
equivalent income he receives under the subsidy, as this is 
the best measure of his real income. It would seem that 
programs which impose relatively too much of a commodity 
will display marginal benefits from income supplements in 
excess of the marginal income and (since average benefits 
converge to a maximum) the marginal benefits are declining. 
If a one dollar increase in income increases benefits by 
one and a half dollars, the last quarter will increase 
benefits by more than a quarter but by less than thirty 
seven and a half cents. Thus the effective taix rate is 
less, and perhaps significantly less than 25 per cent, 
(Programs imposing too little of a commodity would then 
display effective tax rates in excess of the usual rate.) 
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¥e now shift oui' attention to the comparison of public 
housing to Section 236 housing with Rent Supplement. 
The comparison of public housing with Section 236 with 
Rent Supplement requires looking to both benefits and costs. 
It may be the case that one program is preferred by the 
tenants, but if this entails excessive costs society may not 
be willing to underwrite the scheme. 
Estimated benefits from public housing exceed those 
from Section 236 with Rent Supplement in only one case, that 
in which both the maximum measure of public housing units' 
market value and the generalized CES utility function are 
assumed. If we assume the normality of the distribution of 
average benefits across the population and apply a t test, 
the difference is significant at the .005 per cent level. 
In all other cases, Section 236 housing with Rent 
Supplement is found to be more beneficial to tenants than 
public housing, and the differences are significant at the 
,005 per cent level (again subject to the normality 
assumption about the distribution of benefits). Since our 
a priori expectation is that the maximum measure of the 
market value of public housing units is a considerable 
overestimate of the true market value, and since this 
a priori expectation is reinforced by the comparison of the 
three measures based on agency data with the Olsen measure, 
we feel secure in accepting the hypothesis that Section 236 
housing with Rent Supplement would, on the whole, be 
io4 
preferred by public housing tenants if they were given the 
opportunity to choose. 
We have already pointed out, with respect to Section 
236 housing, that despite the average results, some individual 
tenants might be made better off by a change different from 
that preferred on average. This is a suitable place to note 
that our approach assumes cardinal character for utility and 
the comparability of individual utilities. However it is 
not the case that our approach must treat equally a dollar 
of subsidy to all persons. By analyzing the distribution of 
benefits by family characteristics, we can judge whether the 
distribution of benefits is skewed according to some socially 
preferred pattern. Thus the examination of benefits will not 
be complete until we analyze the distribution of benefits 
under the two schemes. However, we postpone this part of 
the investigation until after a discussion of the cost side 
of the subsidy coin. 
The ratio of benefits to subsidies is important in terms 
of both efficiency and equity. Between programs yielding 
equal benefits, that with the higher benefit-subsidy ratio 
should be chosen as it is more efficient, unless society's 
tastes demand the imposition of housing vis-a-vis other 
goods. There is also a trade-off when a higher benefit per 
household program has a lower benefit-subsidy ratio; the 
program with the lower benefits per household but higher 
benefit subsidy ratio can yield greater aggregate benefits 
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at equal cost to the other program, but the benefits would 
be spread over more households. With the single exception 
of the maximum measure of market value coupled with the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function, public housing is always 
estimated to be capable of generating more benefits at equal 
cost vis-a-vis Section 236 with Rent Supplement. Of course 
there are less benefits per household, but when even the 
massive public housing program only reaches some 7 per cent 
of those eligible for it (21) equity concerns begin to demand 
that the cream be thinned some. 
The differences in benefit-subsidy ratios are slight, 
(highest and lowest are only 5 per cent apart) under the 
Cobb-Douglas specification. In this instance, the choice 
between public housing and Section 236 with Rent Supplement 
would seem to rest on the strength of our desire to do 
significant good for some as opposëd to some good for many. 
However, under the generalized CES specification, the spread 
of ratios is much greater (with Section 23^ with Rent 
Supplement having an efficiency rating only 66 per cent that 
of public housing under the Olsen measure). Here signifi­
cant benefits to some come at a significantly greater cost, 
and we expect society would be unwilling to substitute such 
a structure for public housing. 
In summary Section 236 with Rent Supplement would 
likely be preferred by public housing tenants over their 
present positions. It is most likely tenant benefits would 
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rise from 29 to 87 per cent. On the other hand, the subsidy-
involved would most likely rise by 70 to 96 per cent, 
(These ranges are based on the Olsen and mean measures of 
the market value of public housing units.) ¥e feel it 
unlikely that policy makers would be willing to allow such 
an added concentration of resources among a relatively small 
subset of the needy. 
There still remains the issue of the distribution of 
benefits among participants. For this analysis we turn our 
attention from the nominal benefits to benefits measured in 
constant dollars (1971 Washington, D.C. prices are our base). 
Nominal benefits are suitable for judging the actual cost to 
government of programs, and are sufficiently accurate to 
reflect the average level of benefits. However we presume 
that a variation of real benefits among locations is a 
possible drawback of a program, (we would not want partici­
pants to have to suffer because of regional cost 
differentials), cuid thus real benefits, or constant dollar 
benefits, are the measure we subject to analysis here. 
In addition to the presumption that real benefits ought 
not vary with geographical location, there are four other 
equity concerns which we believe underly the rationale for 
subsidy programs. First, persons with lower incomes should 
tend to receive larger benefits as they are in greater need; 
second, benefits should not vary with race; third, elderly 
households should receive greater benefits as they hold a 
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position of distinction in our society; and fourth, larger 
families should receive more housing than smaller ones (and 
perhaps should receive larger benefits since there are more 
persons, usually children, in such families). 
To assure that families with higher incomes receive 
lower benefits, other things equal, programs generally 
correlate income and subsidized rent. Public housing proj­
ects have rent schedules which impose higher rents on 
higher income families, (Regression of subsidized rents 
against income and a constant indicate the rate of increase 
of rents with income is small, on the order of one per cent; 
the regression has an R of ,52 and an F of 1^78,) Section 
236 with Rent Supplement generally increases rent by 25 per 
cent of 6uiy rise in income, However, the lesson learned 
earlier about the relation between marginal benefits and 
marginal subsidy applies here as well. Families of identical 
tastes may receive different benefits from identical 
subsidies if their incomes differ. In a program which 
imposes relatively too much of one good, families with 
higher incomes may obtain higher benefits. A decline in 
subsidy may not overcome the increased benefits associated 
with an increase in income. Thus we must look to the actual 
distribution of benefits to see if a given program is 
equitable; the distribution of subsidies is not sufficient 
inf orma t i on, 
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The simple regression of benefits against income, 
(Table 28), a dummy variable for race, and another dummy to 
distinguish elderly (62 years of age or older) heads of 
households from others, clearly indicates that public 
housing benefits depend positively on income, whites receive 
more benefits than non-whites, and the elderly receive 
greater benefits than others. The only exceptions aire for 
the minimum measure of market value benefits generated with 
a generalized CES utility function; in this case benefits 
vary inversely with income, and the elderly receive fewer 
benefits than others. In all instances, coefficients are 
significant at the .005 per cent level. 
The income coefficient is not really misbehaved if one 
wants larger families to receive larger benefits than 
smaller families. Family size and income are strongly 
correlated and if dummy variables for family composition 
are introduced (Table 29)» the sign of the income term 
becomes significantly negative in every case except for the 
maximum measure of market value benefits generated with a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Larger families clearly 
receive significantly larger benefits than smaller families. 
The sign of the age variable is significantly positive in 
every case for this regression; the elderly are concentrated 
in one and two person households which receive relatively 
fewer benefits, explaining the change in sign as family 
composition is included or deleted. The race variable 
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continues to indicate whites receive significantly more 
benefits. 
The introduction of geographic location into the re­
gression to accompany incomè, age, race, and family 
composition leads to interesting results (Table 30), First, 
location is a significant factor in the distribution of 
benefits. Comparison indicates that benefits tend to be 
higher in cities with higher relative prices of housing, as 
one might expect. Also, while the signs of the age and race 
parameters are unchanged, and larger families still appear 
to receive larger benefits, the income parameter becomes 
significantly positive again in all of the Cobb-Douglas 
cases except that of the minimum measure of market value. 
This would seem to indicate that cities with lower incomes 
tend to provide higher benefits to public housing tenants. 
Such an end could be achieved by such cities requiring lower 
rents of all tenants than do cities with higher incomes, or 
by providing larger subsidies. We tested the hypothesis 
that cities with lower incomes tend to have lower subsidized 
rents, apart from income, and rejected it (based on a 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient of zero). 
The uniform difference in sign between the income coef­
ficients for the Cobb-Douglas specifications and those for 
the generalized CES specifications makes the point one more 
time that simplistic approaches to the issues of tenant 
benefits, such as the reliance on aggregate demand 
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parameters for information, is fraught with problems. The 
Cobb-Douglas specification would support the belief that the 
public housing programming is basically inequitable but for 
institutional corrections made at the city level (and even 
then people of relatively high incomes who happen to live in 
cities of generally lower incomes receive windfall gains 
while people of relatively low incomes who happen to live in 
cities of generally higher incomes receive windfall losses). 
However, the generalized CES specification would tend to 
refute such a view, and support the notion that geographical 
discrepancies are simple inequities, not correctives, 
2 In passing we note with some surprise that the R 's in 
Tables 29 and 30 indicate that the distribution of average 
benefits is remarkably systematic. 
The results for benefits from Section 236 housing with 
Rent Supplement (Tables 31-33) follow much the same pattern 
as public housing benefits except for the race coefficient 
which is negative under the Cobb-Douglas specification and 
positive under the generalized CES specification, (This 
variable is probably irrelevant since we assigned tenants to 
Section 236 units without regard to race in our conceptual 
experiment while in a true to life program, discrimination 
would be likely to appear, if at all, through program ad­
ministration.) The age coefficient is negative when city and 
family composition are omitted, and turns positive when they 
are included. The income coefficient is positive when city 
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and family composition are omitted, is negative for the 
generalized CES, but positive for the Cobb-Douglas when : 
family composition is included, and is negative for the 
generalized CES specification and positive for the Cobb-
Douglas specification when location is added to the 
regression. The difference between the Cobb-Douglas benefits 
income coefficient and the generalized CES benefits income 
coefficient in this last case is the same as in the analogous 
public housing regressions, and leads us to suspect that 
marginal benefits have a significantly different relation to 
marginal income for the generalized CES utility function 
than for the Cobb-Douglas. 
In summary, we conclude that the equity criteria re­
garding income, age, and family size, are met, although the 
reason for the negative correlation between income and 
benefits is not clear. The race and locational equity 
concerns, are not met by the public housing programs, the 
locational criterion is not met by Section 236 housing with 
Rent Supplement, and we are not able to judge whether Section 
236 with Rent Supplement would meet the race criterion. 
The last element in analyzing the programs is to look 
at the extent to which consumers patterns of consumption 
are altered by participation in the programs. Presumably 
one goal of transfers in kind is to limit the benefits to 
changes in the purchase of the subsidized commodity. 
Tables 26 and 27 indicate that this goal is successfully 
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achieved; consumption of non-housing goods increases by less 
than two per cent for both public housing and Section 236 
housing with. Rent Supplement. On the other hand, consumption 
of housing by public housing tenants is most likely I87 to 
205 per cent, on average, of what it was prior to partici­
pation, and under Section 236 with Rent Supplement consumption 
would most likely be 34? per cent of pre-participâtion con­
sumption. These figures indicate that both programs 
radically change the consumption patterns of participants. 
This concludes our presentation of answers to the two 
basic questions of this study. Before passing on to the 
limitations of our results, we will present the income 
elasticities of housing demand implied for our sample by the 
estimates of the generalized CES utility function. 
The aggregate income elasticity for a group is a 
weighted averages of the individual elasticities where the 
weights are individual shares of aggregate income. For our 
sample, the aggregate income elasticity with respect to 
nominal income is .42. If we use De Leeuw's (9) estimate 
that aggregate income elasticity with respect to permanent 
income is one hundred and twenty per cent of the nominal 
income elasticity, we get an estimate of .5. This figure 
does not coincide with the popular wisdo# and indicates that 
analysts and government agencies should reconsider before 
using aggregate elasticity estimates of unity in studying 
the behavior of low income groups. 
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¥e now turn our attention to the limitations of our 
results. Foremost are problems connected with the choice 
and estimation of utility functions. 
The discrepancies in quantitative results between the 
Cobb-Douglas specification and the generalized CES are 
sufficient to make us wonder what would be the consequence 
of using still another functional form. It would seem that 
extensive work on the pattern of consumer's tastes is needed 
before work of this sort can be carried very far. 
The Cobb-Douglas specification presents few estimation 
problems; any body of data containing all positive budget 
shares will lead to consistent results. The cost of this 
virtue is high; with price and income elasticities fixed at 
one, the data is allowed to convey very little information. 
Consequently, without strong a priori confidence in the 
unitary elasticity hypothesis, the Cobb-Douglas results must 
be viewed with skepticism. 
The generalized CES specification leaves the data much 
more freedom. Unfortunately, this freedom is much abused as 
a number of the family compositions violate the theoretical 
parameter constraints. 
At first sight, utilization of theoretical restrictions 
to obtain acceptable parameter estimates seems to be simple 
massaging of the data. However the matter is not so simple. 
If the variance of a parameter estimator is likely to be 
large, as it is in our framework, there is a definite 
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probability, even if the specified utility function is the 
true function, that the parameter estimate fall outside of 
the allowed region. Imposition of the inequality con­
straints is effectively the acceptance of the proposition 
that if a constraint is violated, the most likely true 
parameter value (given the validity of the specification 
itself) is a boundary value. 
At some point, violation of the parameter constraints 
becomes sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
the specification is the true one. For example, we estimated 
a VES utility function which violated its constraints for 
nearly every family composition. We accepted the univer­
sality of the violations as sufficient evidence that the VES 
was an improper specification. Thus, in practice, we have 
settled on a middle ground between the use of theoretical 
constraints as a test of the model and as an intrinsic part 
of the model. 
We are wary of our results because the constraints had 
to be imposed, but we do not think we should reject our 
conclusions on the basis of this problem. 
Finally, we refer to Tables 23 to 25 as evidence that 
the bias which arises as the subsidized quantity, H® of 
housing approaches the equivalent cash grant quantity of 
housing, H*, is not going to be strongly felt in our study. 
The average distance between H* and is a substantial 
fraction of the initial bundle of housing in all cases. 
None of the average differences are near zero. 
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CHAPTER XI: FURTHER NOTIONS 
While this study seemed to us at times to take forever, 
it is actually a very limited effort. In this chapter we 
try to suggest extensions which would improve on our efforts. 
We feel secure that our general format has fruitful applica­
tions in many areas, and that despite our shortcomings, we 
have taken a step in the right direction (even if our only 
success is to illuminate how much is obscured in other, 
"approximate" methods, we have served a worthwhile purpose). 
We see three areas in which our study could be most 
easily improved. First, the data base could be better. 
Second, the model could be extended to more than two com­
modities, Third, additional specifications of the utility 
function could be fitted. 
The easiest improvement in the data base would come 
from surveys which could verify the rent and income observa­
tions. There are incentives in the public housing program to 
understate income, and this may or may not extend to the 
previous rent reports. Verification would minimize this 
source of biased errors in variables. 
More significant than improvements in income and market 
rent data, finer estimates of the prices of housing and 
other goods would be difficult to achieve. Within the 
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confines of our present framework, in which housing services 
are presumed to be an homogeneous good, the only likely al­
ternative would be to specify a particular set of 
characteristics (preferably characteristics common in low 
income housing) and do a survey of housing in the neighborhood 
of public housing projects to develop price data for each 
housing project. A similar survey would have to be done for 
other goods, although it might be sufficient to use the BLS 
city data for the price of non-housing goods. 
Other gains could be scored if the two-commodity world 
were extended to allow for more alternatives. To break the 
non-housing commodity into several components would allow 
relaxation of the assumption of fixed relative prices within 
the non-housing set and would also present opportunities to 
compare non-housing transfers, such as food stamps, with 
housing programs. 
Subdivision of the housing commodity would bring improve­
ments of another sort, and new problems as well. Recent work 
by Olsen (l8) and Grether and Mieszkowski (l4) has attempted 
to estimate the determinants of the market rent or value of 
housing units. The common form is to regress market rent 
(or value) against a series of housing characteristics; the 
coefficients of the independent variables may be viewed as 
market prices. The regression equation for a single city 
would be used in conjunction with BLS inter-city indices, or 
separate regressions could be compiled for each city. A new 
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estimation problem which arises here is that some of the 
independent variables are dummy variables; to include dummy 
variables in the utility function introduces new problems, 
but they are not especially difficult to resolve. 
If one or more variables in the utility function only 
take on specific integer values, the utility maximization 
problem becomes an exercise in integer programming (so long 
as there are no "holes" in the series of possible integer 
values). Fortunately, the least squares estimation problem 
can be transfonned, in much the same fashion as we utilize 
here to account for inequality constraints in least squares 
estimation, to an integer programming framework. 
Thus, subdivision of the housing commodity would be one 
avenue to improving the price data, if we are willing to 
abandon our present confines in which housing services are 
treated as a homogeneous commodity. The prices associated 
with independent variables in a regression with market rent 
(or value) as dependent variable would probably be superior 
to the BLS housing composite. 
Another gain from additional regression estimates of 
housing prices would be the refinement of estimates of the 
market value of public housing units. The high degree of 
agreement between the Olsen and mean measures in this study 
indicates that these improvements are not likely to be very 
significant, 
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The final area of improvement which we see is the 
estimation and analysis of additional functional forms of 
the utility function. The Stone-Geary, or displaced Cobb-
Douglas, would be an obvious possibility, but it would 
probably be fruitful to develop new functional forms with 
desirable properties; regularly behaved (and simple) income 
and price elasticities would be attractive properties. 
Certainly one would want to allow for a variety of elas­
ticity patterns in selecting forms, but there is an added 
issue of comparability of forms. 
Ramsey (22) has built on the work of Box and Cox (3) to 
investigate specification error detection in regression 
analysis. It would be most desirable to implement these 
techniques in choosing among alternative specifications of 
the utility function. Of course these tests are generally 
dependent on assumptions about the true distribution of 
errors, which indicates that further research into the dis­
tributional consequences of theoretical parameter constraints 
is also needed so we can judge how closely theoretical 
distributions may be approximated in our problem, 
A part of the specification investigation would 
hopefully include a search for criteria by which to use 
violations of theoretical parameter constraints as possible 
but not necessary grounds for rejection of a specification. 
In Chapter II we noted that households probably become 
more attached to a dwelling the longer they reside there. 
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This effect could be accounted for by treating the length of 
residence as a factor In the real quantity of housing 
services consumed. We can specify the utility function 
(say Cobb-Douglas) as a function of real housing services, 
f R ) 
and other goods consumed, E. 
u = 
The marginal condition Is then: 
^r/^e  - b ~(r) • 
Now we simply specify H^ ' to be a simple function of the 
physical quantity of housing, H, and the length of residence, 
t. 
= e®* H 
The estimation problem Is then: 
V a In = In g - gt + Inu 
E 
This approach is attractive In Its simplicity as the 
only new data needed are the lengths in residence of house­
holds. The approach is especially attractive in problems in 
•which one is trying to estimate the losses incurred by house­
holds dislocated by some federal program. Indeed, under the 
usual competitive assumptions, moving costs and a loss of 
"neighborhood capital", as described here, may be the only 
identifiable costs to relocation. 
Finally, our estimates could be substantially improved 
if we could collect panel data, that is both times series 
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and cross section. This data can be used to estimate the 
variance-c©variance matrix of parameters across households. 
This step would then permit estimation of the distribution 
of actual benefits about their mean where we have only dis­
cussed the distribution of mean benefits. 
The use of panel data would probably make worthwhile a 
much more technical investigation of the problems associated 
with estimating a bounded benefit measure. Such an investi­
gation would involve a substantial contribution to the 
literature of consumers' surplus which has to date concerned 
itself only with points on the demand curve. 
Finally, this study can serve simply as an example for 
persons interested in the direct benefits from other govern­
ment consumer subsidy programs, such as Section 236 housing, 
the Farmer's Home Loan program, Food Stamps, and Medicare. 
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